Agency conflicts and auditing in private firms by Hope, Ole-Kristian et al.
This file was downloaded from the institutional repository BI Brage - 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi (Open Access) 
 
 
 
 
Agency conflicts and auditing in private firms 
 
Ole-Kristian Hope 
University of Toronto 
 
John Christian Langli 
BI Norwegian Business School  
 
Wayne B. Thomas 
University of Oklahoma 
 
 
 
 
This is the author’s final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article 
published in 
 
 
 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37(2012)7: 500-517 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.06.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The publisher, Elsevier, allows the author to retain rights to “post a revised 
personal version of the text of the final journal article (to reflect changes made in the 
peer review process) on your personal or institutional website or server for scholarly 
purposes, incorporating the complete citation and with a link to the Digital Object 
Identifier (DOI) of the article”. (Publisher’s policy 2011).  
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083097
 
 
Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
 
Ole-Kristian Hope 
Rotman School of Management 
University of Toronto 
okhope@rotman.utoronto.ca 
 
John Christian Langli 
Department of Accounting, Auditing, and Law 
BI Norwegian Business School  
john.c.langli@bi.no 
 
Wayne B. Thomas 
Michael F. Price College of Business 
University of Oklahoma 
wthomas@ou.edu  
 
June 12, 2012 
 
 
Forthcoming, Accounting, Organizations, and Society 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
We appreciate valuable comments from Ahmed Abdel-Meguid, Erlend Kvaal, Alastair 
Lawrence, Gilad Livne, Salvatore Miglietta, Mark Peecher (Editor), Ann Vanstraelen, Joost van 
Buuren, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 5th European Auditing Research 
Network (EARNet) Symposium (Valencia), the European Accounting Association Annual 
Meeting (Istanbul), the 16th Annual International Symposium on Audit Research (Singapore), the 
American Accounting Association Annual Meeting (San Francisco), the 3rd International EIASM 
Workshop on Audit Quality (Bellagio), the 5th CCGR Workshop (Oslo), the 1st Nordic 
Conference on Financial Accounting (Copenhagen), and the 6th European Auditing Research 
Network (EARNet) Symposium (Bergen). We also greatly appreciate a grant from the Centre for 
Corporate Governance Research (BI Norwegian Business School), and the support from its 
director, Professor Øyvind Bøhren. Hope further acknowledges the support of the Deloitte 
Professorship. 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083097
 
Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
 
Abstract 
We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through 
ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors’ increase of 
effort and firms’ choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large 
sample of private firms, we use unique and confidential data (obtained through special 
permission by the government) to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as 
well as extended family relationships (based on marriage and blood lines, going back four 
generations and extending out to fourth cousin) among all shareholders, board members, and 
CEOs. We first find that audit fees, our proxy for audit effort, vary as hypothesized with firm-
level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Second, we find 
evidence that firms in higher agency cost settings respond by having their financial statements 
audited by a higher-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4 firm). However, for CEO family-related settings 
(i.e., where the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members 
related to the CEO increases), we find no evidence of a greater demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
 
Keywords: Agency conflicts, auditing, private firms, family relationships, ownership, audit 
effort, audit demand 
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Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we seek to understand how ownership structures and family relationships 
influence agency costs in private firms. We do this by observing two aspects related to auditing. 
First, in higher agency cost settings, auditors are more likely to supply greater effort to prevent 
misstatement associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We examine how 
auditors adjust their level of effort when auditing financial accounting information. Second, a subset 
of firms in higher agency cost settings likely have a greater demand to choose a higher-quality 
auditor to provide a credible signal of their commitment to higher-quality reporting. To test this, we 
examine the extent to which firms with various characteristics hire a Big 4 auditor. 
 Our examinations draw on very detailed data on ultimate ownership and extended family 
relationships provided by the Norwegian government. We find that audit fees (i.e., our proxy for 
auditor effort) increase with expected agency costs.1 Audit fees relate negatively to ownership 
concentration and to the extent of ownership by the second-largest shareholder. Concentrated 
ownership increases the likelihood that a large shareholder closely monitors managerial actions, and 
an influential second shareholder monitors potential expropriation by the largest shareholder. Audit 
fees also relate negatively to the portion of shares held by the CEO, consistent with ownership 
aligning the incentives of the CEO and other stakeholders. Audit fees are positively associated with 
family relationships between the CEO and the major shareholder (consistent with these family 
relationships indicating reduced monitoring). 
With respect to board independence, we find that audit fees decline as the number of board 
members related to the largest shareholder increases, consistent with fewer agency conflicts 
                                               
1
 The fee (or effort) regression includes controls for 24 client-firm characteristics, five audit-firm variables, as well as 
year and industry fixed effects. 
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between owners and the board. In contrast, as the number of board members related to the CEO 
increases, audit fees increase, suggesting less board independence and more agency conflicts. 
For our tests of demand for Big 4 auditor, we report two interesting sets of results. First, for 
agency settings that are not CEO family-related, we observe results consistent with those obtained 
for our auditor effort tests. Specifically, the propensity to hire a Big 4 auditor increases as 
ownership concentration decreases, ownership of the second largest owner decreases, and the major 
shareholder’s family influence on the board decreases. These results are consistent with the demand 
for a Big 4 auditor being greater in higher agency cost settings. In these settings, a higher-quality 
auditor plays a stronger role in reducing agency costs by sending a more credible signal of 
managers’ commitment to higher-quality reporting. We do not find significant evidence of a 
relation between hiring a Big 4 auditor and the fraction of shares owned by the CEO for our main 
tests, but we do in sensitivity tests. 
We find no association between the choice to hire a Big 4 auditor and CEO family-related 
agency variables. Specifically, we find no significant evidence that the demand for a Big 4 auditor 
is affected when a family relationship exists between the CEO and the major shareholder or as the 
number of board members related to the CEO increases. One explanation for the lack of 
significance could be that while some CEOs in family-related agency settings may wish to signal 
more credible reporting by hiring a Big 4 auditor, other CEOs in these settings may feel a Big 4 
auditor is either unnecessary given close family ties or unwanted because of the gains from 
extracting private benefits which could be reduced by a Big 4 audit.2 
                                               
2
 As per Norway’s Companies Act (§ 7-1), the annual meeting (or General Assembly) of the shareholders elects the 
auditor. While the selection of the auditor is technically the responsibility of the General Assembly (or in practice the 
board), it is almost certainly the case that the CEO plays a significant role in our setting. There is a large literature on 
how CEOs influence the selection of board members and more generally exercise “power” over the board (see, e.g., 
Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Even for large public firms in the U.S. and U.K. the CEO has an impact on which auditor is 
selected (e.g., Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, and Scholz 2011; Firth 1999; Beattie and Fearnley 1995). For our sample of 
smaller private firms, the CEO is expected to have a greater influence on auditor selection because the boards are 
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Our research is motivated by the need to understand agency conflicts facing private firms. 
Private firms make up a significant portion of the economic activity in Norway and nearly all other 
countries, yet prior research focuses primarily on public firms. Given the sometimes vast 
differences between public and private firms (e.g., Beatty, Ke, and Petroni 2002; Chaney, Jeter, and 
Shivakumar 2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005), it is not apparent without testing that results for 
public firms will generalize to private firms. Thus, private firms offer an economically important 
sample worth testing. While the benefits to understanding agency conflicts accrue directly to the 
firm’s investors, they will also be important to many other stakeholders (e.g., creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers), regulatory bodies supervising auditors and firms’ financial reporting, and 
society in general. 
A sample of private (as opposed to public) firms may also offer a stronger test of agency 
conflicts related to ownership structure and family relationships. As we discuss in more detail in 
Section 3, prior research sometimes provides conflicting evidence or conflicting predictions for the 
impact of ownership structures and family relationships on agency conflicts. Our study provides a 
potentially strong setting for testing agency conflicts because private firms exhibit heterogeneous 
ownership characteristics and family relationships. Public firms are more homogeneous, including 
wide-spread ownership, relatively low CEO ownership, and fewer family ties between managers 
and shareholders and between managers and board members. Private firms offer interesting 
ownership structures that potentially increase our understanding of the relation between agency 
conflicts and the supply of auditor effort. For example, private firms show considerable variation in 
ownership percentages by second largest shareholders. This allows us to provide a meaningful test 
of the impact of agency conflicts among shareholders (i.e., monitoring of largest shareholders by 
                                                                                                                                                            
typically smaller, CEO ownership is common (the CEO owns shares in 78% of our sample firms), and the largest owner 
often is related to the CEO. 
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second largest shareholders). Private firms also show greater variation in their choice of auditor 
(only 18.1 percent choose a Big 4 auditor). Nearly all public firms opt for a Big 4 auditor, limiting 
the ability to empirically test signaling through demand for a high-quality auditor. 
Related to tests of the supply of auditor effort, a single-country setting (Norway) controls for 
cross-country variation in audit practices and fees and the strength of legal institutions. Cross-
country differences could easily confound inferences. Norway also offers an environment where the 
impact of litigation on audit fees is relatively limited (Hope and Langli 2010). This increases our 
ability to make more reliable inferences from using audit fees to measure auditor effort, and adds to 
calls for research to better understand the role of firm governance in explaining audit fees (Hay, 
Knechel, and Wong 2006). 
Finally, given the unique data we use in this study, we are able to measure attributes of 
ownership structure and family relationships that have been difficult to measure in the past. 
Specifically, for all private limited liability firms we have detailed information available to compute 
both direct and ultimate ownership for each owner, board member, and CEO.3 In addition, we have 
detailed data on family relationships among all owners, board members, board chairs, and CEOs 
(based on both marriage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth 
cousin). To our knowledge, no prior study has been able to test the effects of family relationship 
using such detailed data. These data, based on merging databases using social security numbers, are 
obtained through special permission from the Norwegian government. Having these data allows us 
to simultaneously test multiple sources of agency conflicts in a single test. In contrast, prior studies, 
because of data limitations, have been able to focus only on a particular test variable (and thus leave 
out potentially important ownership and family details). The full model better controls for multiple 
                                               
3
 For example, suppose an investor owns 30 percent of firm A and 30 percent of firm B, and firm A in turn owns 30 
percent of firm B. The investor’s direct ownership in firm B is 30 percent, while her ultimate ownership is 39 percent. 
Note that our data also account for cross-holdings. 
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agency settings. We show that the ability to simultaneously test the association of these variables on 
auditor effort and firms’ selection of the auditor can affect conclusions in some cases. 
We next briefly discuss the importance of accounting and auditing, the role of auditing in 
private firms, and the importance of auditing in the private firm market. Section 3 provides 
hypotheses of the expected impact that agency conflicts have on the supply of auditor effort and the 
demand for a Big 4 auditor. Section 4 introduces our research design. Section 5 provides details on 
the data underlying our study. We present empirical results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Background, Related Research, and Institutional Setting 
2.1 Importance of Auditing in Private Firm Setting 
An external audit plays a role in corporate governance by providing an independent 
assessment of the accuracy and fairness with which financial statements represent the results of 
operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. While researchers 
commonly consider the role of auditing for public firms, audits for private firms can also play a 
role. Private firms typically disclose less non-accounting information, potentially increasing the 
importance of financial accounting information to external providers of capital in monitoring 
managerial activities. In addition, managerial activities of public firms are partially constrained by 
market-based mechanisms. For example, public firms are more susceptible to takeovers, indicating 
that such mechanisms help control for agency conflicts (Lennox 2005). In the absence of market-
based measures of firm-value (and other sources of information such as financial analysts), high-
quality reporting may be particularly relevant for evaluation of managerial performance and to 
support personnel and compensation decisions (Indjejikian and Matejka 2009), resulting in a 
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demand for high-quality audits (Chaney et al. 2004).4  
 
2.2 Brief Review of Prior Research 
Although there is a huge auditing literature, there is relatively limited prior evidence on 
auditing issues in private firms.5 Some prior studies investigate private firms’ choice to have an 
audit. Carey, Simnett, and Tanewski (2000) find that nonfamily involvement correlates positively 
with the voluntary demand for auditing in Australian family businesses. Blackwell, Noland, and 
Winters (1998) find that private U.S. firms that elect to have their financial statements audited pay 
significantly lower interest rates than nonaudited private firms. Similarly, Allee and Yohn (2009) 
use National Survey of Small Business Finances data from 2003 to examine the financial reporting 
practices of small privately held U.S. businesses. They find that firms with audited financial 
statements enjoy greater access to credit. Using a large sample of private firms from the World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys, Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2011) show that firms which have their 
financial statements reviewed by an external auditor experience easier access to external financing 
and obtain those funds at lower costs.  
In a recent study, Lennox and Pittman (2011) make use of a natural experiment in the United 
Kingdom. Starting in 2004, an external audit is no longer required for private U.K. companies. 
                                               
4
 According to Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), a choice to contract for high-quality auditing (e.g., proxied by 
choosing a Big 4 auditing firm) could signal financial reporting quality and perhaps deter a rigorous tax audit in the 
private firm market. They further argue that private firms may also want to convince suppliers, clients, or employees of 
the credibility of their financial statements. This may be especially important in an environment like Norway where 
financial statements of all limited liability companies (public and private) are publicly available. To illustrate, most 
information from the income statements and the balance sheet, in addition to names and shareholdings of owners, 
CEOs, and board members, is freely available through websites (e.g., www.proff.no). Information on family 
relationships between owners, CEOs, and board members, however, is not publicity available. 
5
 The usefulness of accounting information for private firms has been shown in recent studies including Chen, Hope, Li, 
and Wang (2011) and Indjejikian and Matejka (2007). Chen et al. find that emerging market firms with higher financial 
reporting quality exhibit greater investment efficiency. Indjejikian and Matejka further show that accounting 
information is used in compensation contracting by U.S. private firms. Studies that compare the financial reporting 
quality of public and private firms include Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), Asker, 
Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011), and Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2012). 
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Lennox and Pittman focus on the firms that are audited under both regimes (i.e., the firms that 
reveal their preference to be audited). They find that these companies attract upgrades to their credit 
ratings. In contrast, companies that no longer submit to an audit suffer credit rating downgrades. 
These findings provide further support for the usefulness of auditing in a private firm setting. 
There is also research on how audit fees relate to ownership characteristics, primarily for 
publicly traded companies. For example, Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993) find that ownership 
control, defined in their study as “directors’ beneficial and non-beneficial shareholdings and all 
disclosed shareholdings in excess of five percent,” is negatively related to levels of audit fees for 
their full sample of 280 publicly traded U.K. companies from 1987. In contrast, they find no 
significant effect for smaller auditees (i.e., firms that are more similar to the private firms in our 
sample). 
Mitra, Hossain, and Deis (2007) examine 358 NYSE-listed manufacturing and retail 
companies that were audited by Big 5 auditors in year 2000 (i.e., firms that are very different from 
the small private firms in our sample). They document that audit fees are positively associated with 
diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) and 
negatively associated with institutional blockholder ownership (i.e., having 5% or more individual 
shareholding).  
Hay, Knechel, and Ling (2008) show that an indicator for whether there is a single 
shareholder who controls 20% or more of the company’s stock is positively related to audit fees for 
New Zealand public companies in 1995 (sample size: 130). However, there is no significant 
correlation in 2005 (sample size: 83). 
As discussed, almost all prior research is on public, not private firms. In addition, given that 
all private limited liability companies in Norway are audited during our sample period, voluntary 
demand for audits per se is not an issue for our study. The choice we examine is the demand for a 
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high-quality auditor (Big 4). Equally important, no prior study has employed detailed data on family 
relationships among shareholders, board members, and CEOs to measure agency conflicts, and to 
our knowledge few prior studies have as detailed measures of ownership as this study.6 Finally, in 
contrast to most prior research, we examine the effects of several agency cost related factors 
simultaneously. In sum, although there is sufficient extant research ensuring that we have 
theoretical support for our hypotheses, we believe our study fills a void by examining a large 
sample of private firms and testing for potentially important effects for which prior research has had 
limited data. 
 
2.3 Institutional Setting 
In Norway, external auditing of all private limited liability companies is mandated by the 
government. In the rest of Europe, only private companies that meet certain size criteria are required 
to have their financial statements audited.7 The statutory auditor is expected to provide different 
stakeholders of the company assurance concerning the accuracy of the financial statements, the non-
existence of financial statement fraud, and the going concern status (e.g., Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2008). 
Norwegian auditing standards follow International Standards of Auditing (ISA). The ISAs 
require auditors to assess several agency conflicts when assessing audit risk. For example, from ISA 
315, an auditor assesses risk of material misstatement by understanding the entity’s ownership and 
governance structures and the way that the entity is structured (paragraph 11). This could include 
noting whether the client firm has an owner-manager, more than one owner, dispersed ownership, 
                                               
6
 Lennox (2005) investigates the relation between management ownership and audit firm size among private U.K. 
companies.  
7
 Norway and Sweden were the two last countries in Europe that abandoned the requirement that all limited liability 
companies should disclose audited financial statements. Starting November 10, 2010 in Sweden and January 1, 2011 in 
Norway, the (very) smallest firms may decide not to engage an auditor.  
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etc.8 In addition, IAS 315 suggests that assessing risk involves understanding the relations between 
owners and other people, which likely includes family relationships (paragraph A23). Referring to 
the audits of smaller firms (which are much more likely to be private), IAS 315 states that the 
presence of an owner-manager may mitigate certain risks arising from a lack of segregation of 
duties (paragraph A76). We believe that our investigation of the relation between audit and 
ownership characteristics and family relationships provides a unique setting for understanding the 
interplay between agency conflicts and auditing in the private firm segment of the economy. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The framework for our tests can be understood by considering that there is a principal (i.e., 
the party for whom financial statements are prepared such as owners, creditors, regulators, 
suppliers, etc.) and two agents (the manager and the auditor). We observe the actions of these two 
agents – the manager’s demand for a Big 4 auditor and the auditor’s supply of effort – to understand 
the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships on agency costs. 
In the first principal-agent setting, the manager understands that her potentially suboptimal 
actions are unobservable to the principal, and therefore the principal will impose a monetary penalty 
on the manager. To avoid this penalty in high agency cost settings, the manager is willing to hire a 
higher-quality auditor to provide a more credible signal that financial statements are free of material 
misstatement and that the manager has committed to refrain from siphoning private benefits. 
Previous research suggests that larger auditors provide higher quality audits (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; 
Palmrose 1988) and that Big N auditors in particular provide higher-quality outcomes in a variety of 
settings (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; DeFond 1992; Mansi, 
                                               
8
 Standard auditing textbooks provide further support. For example, Arens, Elder, and Beasley (2012) note that the 
distribution of ownership has the potential to affect audit risk. 
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Maxwell, and Miller 2004). These arguments lead to the expectation that firms in higher agency 
cost settings are more likely to demand a Big 4 auditor. This is the typical principal-agent 
framework put forth in most auditor selection studies.9 
The second agency setting involves the auditor acting as an agent, having a preference for 
compensation and a disutility for effort. In other words, the optimal action for the auditor is to 
supply the minimum amount of effort needed to “obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error” 
(ISA 2010, paragraph 5). Doing so maximizes the auditor’s utility. The higher the audit effort is, the 
less likely type II errors occur in audit reports (e.g., Dye 1993; Laux and Newman 2010). Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter 1993; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, 
and Raghunandan 2003), we measure auditor effort using audit fees. Due to transparency of the 
audit market and the large number of auditors and audit firms in Norway (Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway, Annual Report 2007), the market for auditing services is highly competitive. 
Audit fees should therefore reflect the effort assessed by the auditor in assuring the accuracy of 
financial statements.10 
                                               
9
 The obvious counterargument is that hiring a Big 4 auditor is more costly. For example, Chaney et al. (2004) conclude 
that U.K. private firms choose auditors that minimize their audit fees. However, they do not examine whether audit fees 
vary with agency conflicts as in our study. We contend that firms in higher agency cost settings are more willing to hire 
a Big 4 auditor (and incur the higher audit cost) because of the benefits received from signaling more credible reporting. 
10
 Some prior research in other settings suggests that it is important to distinguish the component of audit fees that also 
reflects compensation for litigation risk. We do not view this distinction important for our tests. In addition, both the 
litigation risk and reputation risk of auditors are relatively low for private firms in Norway. For a detailed discussion of 
this issue, see Hope and Langli (2010), who examine all court cases and other legal proceedings against auditors over a 
60-year period and conclude that auditors face much lower litigation risk in Norway than in other more litigious 
environments. It is important to note that, even in an environment with low litigation, there is still a role for agency 
costs. For example, debt and equity financing will be more costly when agency costs are high. To the extent that 
companies in settings with high agency problems are able to signal more credible reporting, financing will be less costly 
and more accessible. Firms can signal this credibility with an audit. As another example, suppliers may also be 
concerned about the viability of the firm when deciding whether to enter long-term contracts. To the extent that the 
supplier can adequately rely on financial reports to assess the firm’s long-run viability and stability, they are more 
willing to enter those contracts, increasing the operating efficiency and profitability of the firm (e.g., Dou, Hope, and 
Thomas 2012). 
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In the next section, we develop our six hypotheses. The first three focus on ownership 
characteristics – ownership concentration among all shareholders, ownership by second largest 
shareholder, and fraction of shares held by the CEO. The second three hypotheses focus on family 
relationships – family ties between the CEO and largest owning family, percentage of board 
members related to largest owning family, and family ties between the CEO and board members. 
For each of these six settings, we consider whether agency concerns affect managers’ decision to 
hire a Big 4 auditor or auditors’ supply of effort. 
 
3.1. Ownership Structures 
3.1.1. Ownership Concentration 
Prior research provides evidence that managers, when left unmonitored, are more likely to 
manage earnings, commit fraud, or make suboptimal investment decisions (e.g., Biddle and Hillary 
2006; Hope and Thomas 2008). Thus, shareholder monitoring is an important mechanism by which 
agency costs can be reduced. However, while all shareholders have the responsibility to monitor 
managerial activities, the benefits of doing so by any individual shareholder are proportional to the 
percentage of shares owned. As the percentage of ownership by individual shareholders increases 
(i.e., concentration increases), the more willing individual shareholders are to incur necessary 
monitoring costs. 
Monitoring by a large shareholder could take many forms. Perhaps the most commonly 
discussed means of monitoring discussed in the literature involves a large shareholder having a seat 
on the board. Several studies show in a variety of contexts the board’s role in monitoring managers 
(e.g., Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010; Beasley 1996; 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Byrd and Hickman 2002; Anderson, Mansi, and Reed 2004; 
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and Laksmana 2008, to name just a few).11 Other forms of direct monitoring would be a large 
shareholder actively participating in the firm’s operations or having routine meetings with 
managers. As the proportion of ownership increases, the more beneficial it is for large shareholders 
to engage in these types of costly direct monitoring activities. Large shareholders can also serve to 
block business decisions that may be considered suboptimal (e.g., aggressive expansion through 
negative net present value projects). Doing so involves an investment in time and expertise by the 
shareholder to understand the consequences of major business decisions. Large shareholders are 
also likely to have more control over the firm’s dividend (or capital distribution) policy, as a way to 
further discipline managers’ actions. 
When ownership is widely dispersed, it is economically less feasible for any individual 
shareholder to incur significant monitoring costs, because she will receive only a small portion of 
benefits. This is the typical “vertical agency cost” (e.g., Gogineni, Linn, and Yadav 2010) argument 
(i.e., conflicts between managers and owners) and leads to the prediction that agency costs are 
expected to be lower as ownership concentration increases.12 When agency costs are lower, we 
expect that auditors supply less effort and there is less demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
 
H1a: As ownership concentration increases, audit fees decrease.  
H1b: As ownership concentration increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.1.2 Second Largest Shareholder 
While the previous discussion explains the need for shareholders to monitor managers, the 
literature also establishes the need for shareholders to monitor one another. For example, controlling 
                                               
11
 See Bhagat and Black (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for 
surveys on corporate boards. 
12
 An alternative prediction is that greater ownership concentration leads to entrenchment, resulting in higher agency 
costs. 
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shareholders have the ability to exploit minority shareholders in closely-held corporations (e.g., 
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997, 1998; Laeven and Levine 2008; Nagar, Petroni, and Wolfenson 
2011). Such exploitation can include higher compensation to controlling shareholders, 
misappropriation of assets, and dilution of minority shareholders’ interests through the issuance of 
stock or dividends (Gogineni et al. 2010). As the ownership stake of a second shareholder increases, 
so does her ability and willingness to effectively monitor the largest shareholder. The monitoring 
activities by the second largest shareholder would be similar to those used by the largest shareholder 
to monitor managers (see discussion above in Section 3.1.1).  
Pagano and Roell (1998) specify conditions under which large shareholders monitor each 
other, reducing expropriation and improving firm performance. Their theoretical model predicts that 
expropriation of minority shareholders is likely to be less severe when the ownership stake of non-
controlling shareholders is more concentrated, as such concentration makes it easier and more 
effective to monitor the controlling shareholder (see also Bloch and Hege 2001; Volpin 2002; 
Gogineni et al. 2010). This is the typical “horizontal agency cost” (e.g., Gogineni et al. 2010) 
argument (i.e., conflicts between majority and minority shareholders) and leads to the prediction 
that as ownership by the second largest shareholder increases, agency costs decrease. 
 
H2a: As ownership of the second largest owner increases, audit fees decrease. 
H2b: As ownership of the second largest owner increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.1.3 CEO Ownership 
A dominant belief in the literature is that as CEO ownership increases, her incentives align 
more with those of other shareholders, reducing the agency problem that arises from separation of 
ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Tirole 2006). This is known as the 
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alignment effect. In our sample, CEO ownership is high compared with prior studies (e.g., mean 
CEO ownership is 49% of the shares in our study). We predict that as CEO ownership increases, 
agency costs decline and therefore auditors supply less effort. Consistent with the belief that CEO 
ownership reduces agency costs, we also predict that firms with high CEO ownership are less likely 
to employ a Big 4 auditor. 
 
H3a: As CEO ownership increases, audit fees decrease. 
H3b: As CEO ownership increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.2. Family Relationships 
3.2.1. CEO and Major Shareholder 
Major shareholders are often family members of the CEO for private firms. There are 
interesting competing hypotheses when the CEO is related to the major shareholder. Because of the 
family relationship, these shareholders no longer act as independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’ 
decisions. In addition, family-controlled firms are likely to suffer from greater horizontal agency 
costs. It may be easier for major shareholders, who are family members of the CEO, to extract 
private benefits from minority shareholders or other stakeholders (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000). The reason it may be easier to extract 
these benefits is that major family owners typically have strong influence over choosing members 
of the board (Johannisson and Huse 2000). Consequently, the monitoring effectiveness of the board 
may be impaired when its composition is determined primarily by the CEO’s family. These 
arguments would support the idea that agency costs will increase when there is a family relation 
between the CEO and major shareholder. In this case, auditors are expected to supply more effort, 
and firms are expected to demand Big 4 auditors. 
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An alternative view is that family member CEOs are less likely to act in ways that 
opportunistically harm other family members. That is, installing a family member as the CEO could 
be a mechanism through which family-owned companies can increase their monitoring of 
management and reduce the need for external monitoring. If this effect dominates, the agency costs 
are smaller when the CEO is a family member because familial ties are likely to create closer 
alignment of the CEO’s preferences with those of family owners. 
The demand for a Big 4 in the presence of CEO-major shareholder family relationship also 
presents interesting counter-arguments. One the one hand, demand for a Big 4 auditor could 
increase to the extent that this family relationship increases agency costs. Agency costs would be 
higher for reasons discussed above (e.g., lack of independent monitoring by major shareholders and 
expropriation of minority shareholders). In this setting, CEOs potentially benefit by signaling their 
commitment to higher-quality reporting. 
On the other hand, demand for a Big 4 could decrease under at least two conditions. First, 
while hiring a Big 4 auditor has commitment value for the firm (and the CEO), the CEO in a 
family-relationship setting may wish to reduce audit cost by not hiring a Big 4 auditor. Major 
shareholders’ family relationship with the CEO may negate the need for costly independent 
verification by Big 4 auditors. The saved resources by using a less costly auditor increase firm 
value, which is in the best interest of both the CEO and major shareholders (who are in the same 
family). Second, the CEO also has incentives not to demand a higher-quality auditor when this 
means that her ability (or her family’s ability, including the major shareholder’s ability) to extract 
private benefits from the firm would be limited through such a hire. Presumably, Big 4 auditors 
would have a greater ability to limit these private benefits.  
Thus, for this CEO family-related agency setting, the demand for a Big 4 auditor reflects the 
trade-off between the benefits from signaling higher-quality reporting versus the costs of additional 
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audit fees and reduced consumption of private benefits. Because of competing arguments, we state 
our fourth hypothesis as two-sided: 
 
H4a: When a family relationship exists between the major shareholder and the CEO, audit 
fees are affected. 
H4b: When a family relationship exists between the major shareholder and the CEO, choice 
of Big 4 auditor is affected. 
 
3.2.2. Board Independence 
Boards are meant to protect shareholders’ assets and the interests of the company’s other 
stakeholders (e.g., creditors and employees). In this sense, boards are directed to monitor the 
activities of managers. An extensive literature exists which supports the notion that more 
independent boards more effectively monitor managers’ activities. Firms with more independent 
boards commit less financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996) and have less earnings management or 
provide fewer discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1996; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000; Xie, 
Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; Jaggi, Leung, and Gul 2009).  
However, consistent with our two-sided predictions for H4a, as the proportion of board 
members from the CEO’s family increases, audit effort could either increase or decrease. With 
respect to the demand for a Big 4 auditor, the relation is also not obvious because the CEO faces 
conflicting incentives. The additional (potentially unnecessary) costs associated with hiring a Big 4 
auditor and the reduced ability of the CEO or her family board members to privately benefit from 
these family relationships reduce the expected demand for a Big 4 auditor in this higher agency cost 
setting. As a result, the demand for a Big 4 auditor may be confounded in the presence of family 
relationships between the CEO and board members. 
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We propose two hypotheses related to board independence. First, we predict that family 
relationships between major shareholders and the board imply that owners have insiders to monitor 
managers, which makes audited information less important. In other words, fewer agency conflicts 
reduce the need for auditing. This setting would result in the reduced supply of auditor effort and 
less demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
Second, if there are family ties between the CEO and board members, given that there are 
competing arguments as to whether the board will act more or less independently of the CEO, our 
hypothesis is two-sided. We summarize these hypotheses as: 
 
H5a: As the proportion of board members from the largest owning family increases, audit 
fees decrease. 
H5b: As the proportion of board members from the largest owning family increases, choice 
of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
H6a: As the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases, audit fees are 
affected. 
H6b: As the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases, choice of Big 4 
auditor is affected. 
 
4. Research Design 
For our auditor effort tests, we use model (1) to test our six hypotheses of the relation 
between agency costs and the supply of auditor effort after controlling for numerous firm and audit 
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characteristics that explain normal audit fees.13 Specifically, we regress the log of raw audit fees 
(LNFEE) on our six test variables as well as 24 client-firm characteristics, five audit-firm variables, 
and year and industry fixed effects (firm subscripts omitted).  
 
LNFEEt = α0 + α1OWNER_CONCt + α2OWNER_SECONDt + α3OWNER_CEOt + 
α4FAM_CEO/OWNERt + α5FAM_BOARD/OWNERt + α6FAM_BOARD/CEOt + 
α7LNSALESt + α8LNEMPLOYt + α9LEVt + α10CHLEVt + α11INVRECt + 
α12GROWTHt + α13ROAt + α14INCPICt + α15DECPICt + α16INTANGt + 
α17UNITEMSt + α18NOINDt + α19FOREIGNt + α20LNSUBt + α21FYEt + 
α22INVESTMENTSt + α23ACQUISITIONt + α24LOSSt + α25CURRATIOt + 
α26BIG4t + α27GAAPt + α28CHGAAPt + α29INDSPECt + α30CHAUDITORt  + 
α31LASTYRAUDITt+ α32MODOPINIONSt + α32CHCEOt    + α33CITYt + 
∑α34,cCOUNTYc + ∑α35,iINDi + ∑α36,yYRy + νt 
(1) 
 
The Appendix lists all variables employed and their definitions. α1 through α6 test 
hypotheses H1a through H6a, while the remaining variables serve as controls. We measure ownership 
concentration (OWNER_CONC) using the Herfindahl index and expect that as ownership 
concentration increases, agency costs decrease (α1 < 0). To test the second hypothesis, we use 
ultimate ownership of the second largest owner (OWNER_SECOND), and expect that as ownership 
increases, agency costs decrease (α2 < 0).14 For the third hypothesis, we use the fraction of shares 
                                               
13
 This approach is similar to first estimating abnormal audit fees as the residuals from a regression of total audit fees on 
the control variables and then using the residuals as the dependent variable in a regression on our test variables. No 
inferences are affected if we use that approach instead. 
14
 We provide a caveat that there is a possible negative mechanical relation between OWNER_SECOND and 
OWNER_CONC (see correlation in Table 2 below). When excluding either of these variables from the model, 
inferences remain the same for the demand model (discussed next). For the effort model, we find that OWNER_CONC 
becomes insignificant when OWNER_SECOND is dropped from the test. 
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owned by the CEO as our primary measure (OWNER_CEO) and predict a negative effect of CEO 
ownership on agency costs (α3 < 0). In Section 6.3.4, we test whether this relation is non-linear. 
For our fourth hypothesis, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is a member 
of the largest owning family (FAM_CEO/OWNER). We predict that family ownership has an effect 
on agency costs (α4 ≠ 0). We refrain from making a directional hypothesis due to the opposing 
forces that are at work. For the fifth hypothesis, we measure family influence of the largest 
shareholder on the board as the proportion of board members related to the largest shareholder 
(FAM_BOARD/OWNER). We expect a negative relation (α5 < 0). Finally, for our sixth hypothesis 
the test variable is the proportion of board members related to the CEO (FAM_BOARD/CEO). 
FAM_BOARD/CEO can thus be interpreted as a measure of the strength of family ties between the 
CEO and the board.15 As with our fourth hypotheses, we refrain from a directional hypothesis (i.e., 
α6 ≠ 0). 
Our choice of control variables is guided by prior research (e.g., DeFond, Raghunandan, and 
Subramanyam 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Choi, Kim, and Zang 2010; Hope and 
Langli 2010) and we additionally employ other variables relevant for our private firm setting. 
Therefore, model (1) examines whether our ownership characteristics and family relationships 
explain audit fees beyond an extensive set of factors previously identified in the literature. 
We include the natural log of sales (LNSALES), natural log of number of employees 
(LNEMPLOY), leverage (LEV) and change in leverage (CHLEV), proportion of inventory and 
receivables to total assets (INVREC), sales growth (GROWTH), return on assets (ROA), increases or 
decreases in paid-in capital (INCPIC and DECPIC), proportion of intangible assets to total assets 
(INTANG), the existence of special or unusual items (UNITEMS), the number of industries in which 
                                               
15
 Note that FAM_BOARD/OWNER and FAM_BOARD/CEO measure the degree of family influence rather than just the 
existence of such influence. 
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the firm operates (NOIND), the existence of foreign operations (FOREIGN), natural logarithm of 
the number of subsidiaries (LNSUB), a fiscal year-end other than December 31 (FYE), long- and 
short-term investments in securities scaled by sales (INVESTMENTS), acquisitions during the year 
(ACQUISITIONS), negative earnings (LOSS), current ratio (CURRATIO), Big 4 audit firm (BIG4), 
use of regular GAAP (GAAP; as opposed to simplified GAAP for smaller enterprises), changed 
to/from regular GAAP from/to simplified GAAP during the year (CHGAAP), auditor industry 
specialization (INDSPEC), change of auditor during the year (CHAUDITOR), an indicator for the 
last year of the incumbent auditor (LASTYRAUDIT), audit report modifications (MODOPINIONS), 
change in CEO during the year (CHCEO), and whether the client resides in a municipality officially 
classified as a city or not (CITY). In addition, we include fixed effects for the county in which the 
client firm is located (COUNTY), two-digit industry (IND), and year (YR). 
To test our six hypotheses of the demand for a Big 4 auditor, we employ the following logit 
regression model with control variables (firm subscript omitted): 
 
BIG4t = β0 + β1OWNER_CONCt + β2OWNER_SECONDt + β3OWNER_CEOt + 
β4FAM_CEO/OWNERt + β5FAM_BOARD/OWNERt + β6FAM_BOARD/CEOt + 
β7LNTAt + β8LEVt + β9UNSECUREDt + β10LOSSt + β11FOREIGNt + 
β12EXANTEFINt + β13INCPICt + β14ROAt + β15CITYt + ∑β16,cCOUNTYc + 
∑β17,iINDi + ∑β18,yYRy + ηt 
(2) 
 
β1 through β6 test hypotheses H1b through H6b, while the remaining variables serve as 
controls. BIG4 is an indicator variable for whether the firm employs a Big 4 auditing firm or a 
forerunner. We expect that our agency variables relate to the demand for a Big 4 auditor in the same 
way that they relate to auditor effort. Specifically, our indicator variable for a Big 4 auditor is 
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expected to relate negatively to OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, OWNER_CEO, and 
FAM_BOARD/OWNER. For our two CEO family-related variables (FAM_CEO/OWNER and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO), we provide expectations consistent with those for auditor effort. That is, 
family relationships between the CEO and either the major shareholder (FAM_CEO/OWNER) or 
board members (FAM_BOARD/CEO) may decrease or increase the demand for Big 4 auditors. 
We base the control variables on prior research that has examined the choice of Big 4 
auditors (e.g., Khurana and Raman 2004; Knechel, Niemi, and Sundgren 2008). In particular, we 
control for firm size (LNTA), leverage (LEV), unsecured debt (UNSECURED), loss firms (LOSS), 
the percentage of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN), operating cash flow less net investments in 
tangible and intangible fixed assets scaled by current assets (EXANTEFIN), increase in paid-in 
capital (INCPIC), return on assets (ROA), and whether the client firm is located in a city or not 
(CITY). Finally, the logit regression models include county, industry, and year fixed effects. As an 
alternative specification, we additionally include controls for four alternative ownership 
characteristics (INSTITUTIONAL, STATE, INTERNATIONAL, and INDUSTRIAL). 
 
5. Data on Ownership and Family Relationships 
We obtain our data from two sources. First, firm-specific information, such as the firm’s 
financial information, auditor, CEO, board members, and owners, comes from Experian AS. 
Experian collects information from the Brønnøysund Register Center (BRC), which is an 
administrative agency responsible for a number of national control and registration schemes for 
business and industry. These data are publicly available. Second, information on family 
relationships comes from the National Register Office (NRO). In contrast to BRC data, NRO data 
are generally not publicly available. Specifically, the social security numbers of any person having 
roles as owners, CEOs, or board members are not available unless special permissions are obtained. 
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Family relationships among individuals are also not publicly available. We gained access to these 
data through a contract with the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at the 
Norwegian Business School. CCGR obtained permissions to gather and merge data from the two 
sources in accordance with confidentiality and secrecy rules set forth by the Norwegian Data 
Inspectorate, an independent administrative body that is set up to ensure that private and public 
storage of data are in accordance with the Norwegian Personal Data Act.  
In Norway, all limited liability firms, independent of size and listing status, must send 
audited financial statements to the Center for Annual Accounts (CAA), which is part of the BRC. 
According to the Accounting Act (paragraph 7-26), limited liability firms that do not qualify as 
“small enterprises” are required to disclose its 20 largest shareholders and their shareholdings in the 
notes as long as individual shareholdings exceed one percent. Firms that qualify as small enterprises 
must disclose names and shareholdings of the ten largest shareholders as long as the shareholder 
owns five percent or more. In addition, the Accounting Act requires disclosure of names and 
shareholdings of all CEOs and members of the Board and the Corporate Assembly. Experian 
collects ownership information from the notes and to the extent possible looks up the social security 
number of each owner. The names of CEOs and board members are collected from the Central 
Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (CCRLE), which is also a part BRC. Data that identify 
CEOs and board members (from CCRLE) are merged with data on ownership (from CAA) using 
the social security number for each individual that occurs in the two databases.16  
The notes to the accounts specify direct ownership for each firm. Utilizing the fact that 
direct ownership is available for all limited liability firms, data on ultimate ownership for each firm 
has been calculated by tracing ownership structures. Information on families’ ultimate ownership 
                                               
16
 For any pair of individuals, our data source has classified the pair in terms of a basic family relationship type. These 
types are parent, grandparent, great grandparent, great-great grandparent, and marriage. Using these basic types, we 
have generated 18 types of family relationships between two individuals, including relationships like brother, sister, 
cousin, uncle/aunt, and nephew/niece. 
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and family influence on the CEO and boards has been constructed by checking for relationships by 
blood and/or marriage for any pair of persons that occurs for owners, board members, CEOs, and 
Chairman using data from NRO. Family relationships may cover up to four generations. We 
assigned persons to the same family if they (as of year-end 2007) are related through their parents, 
grandparents, or by marriage. A single person without relatives constitutes a family of size one. 
 
6. Sample and Results  
6.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection procedure is explained in Table 1. Our sample period spans 2000 
through 2007. We include only firms that are not publicly traded on a stock exchange. We exclude 
firms with sales or total assets less than NOK 800,000 and firms with missing information 
concerning audit fees or with fees below NOK 3,000. We further eliminate financial firms, firms 
with missing information, subsidiaries, and firm controlled by unknown owners or the State.17 
Because the data provider did not provide a split between audit and non-audit fees for years 2003 
through 2005, our sample covers the five-year period from 2000-2002 and 2006-2007. We have a 
final sample of 185,109 firm-year observations. Our tests are based on pooled samples, and we use 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.18 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. As can be expected for a sample of private 
firms, firms are small on average (mean SALES of NOK 16 million) but with a large standard 
deviation. Audit fees (FEE) have a mean of NOK 21,452, and 18.1 percent of firms employ Big 4 
auditors. As expected, ownership concentration (OWNER_CONC) is quite high for private firms, 
with a mean Herfindahl index of 0.605. CEO ownership (OWNER_CEO) is also quite high (mean of 
                                               
17
 To mitigate the potential influence of outliers in such a large sample, we remove observations with (absolute) 
studentized residuals exceeding two. No inferences are affected by this choice. Similarly, no conclusions change if we 
instead winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
18
 Results are consistent when employing the Fama-MacBeth approach. 
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49.2 percent). On average, the CEO comes from the largest family (FAM_CEO/OWNER) in 70.6 
percent of the cases, 71.2 percent of board members come from the largest family 
(FAM_BOARD/OWNER), and 15.1 percent of the board members are family members of the CEO 
(FAM_BOARD/CEO). Panel B presents Spearman correlation coefficients among the dependent 
variables, test variables, and primary control variables.19 As expected, most of the variables are 
significantly correlated. However, unreported variance inflation factors and condition indices give 
no indication that multicollinearity is a serious issue in our multivariate analyses.20 Important for 
our tests, and consistent with our unique data on ownership and family relationships, we are 
interested in testing the incremental effect of one agency characteristic while holding the others 
constant. 
 
6.2 Tests of Hypotheses  
6.2.1 Auditor Effort Tests 
We report the results of tests of whether auditors’ fees (i.e., auditors’ effort) vary with 
agency conflicts in private firms in Table 3. Column 1 reports our primary specification with all test 
variables included simultaneously and measured as continuous variables (except 
FAM_CEO/OWNER which is an indicator variable). The regression has an adjusted R2 of 52.8% 
and we note that most of the control variables are significant in the predicted direction. For 
example, audit fees are higher for firms that are larger, have more financial leverage, have unusual 
items, are more diversified (in terms of industries and subsidiaries), have greater foreign operations, 
                                               
19
 Note that correlation coefficients are provided for descriptive purposes only and do not constitute tests of our 
hypotheses. Specifically, we are testing our agency cost proxies against a proxy for abnormal audit fees; hence it is 
essential to control for the normal factors that explain fees (i.e., risk and effort variables). It is also important to control 
for other agency-related variables, as we do in our multiple regression tests. 
20
 Specifically, no variance inflation factors are above 3.04 in any of the specifications tabulated in Table 3 and Table 4.  
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engage in acquisitions, and employ a Big 4 auditor.21  
The estimated coefficient on OWNER_CONC is negative and significant, consistent with our 
prediction in H1a that greater ownership concentration leads to easier monitoring of managers, 
translating into less effort by external auditors. Next, the coefficient on OWNER_SECOND is 
negative and significant, a finding which is in line with H2a and recent research in finance 
suggesting that a strong second shareholder can mitigate potential exploitation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholder. We further find a negative and significant coefficient 
on OWNER_CEO, consistent with H3a that CEO ownership aligns managers’ interests with those of 
the firms’ other stakeholders. 
The next three variables, FAM_CEO/OWNER, FAM_BOARD/OWNER, and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO, measure differences in monitoring and independence. Whereas 
FAM_CEO/OWNER captures the family relationship between the CEO and major shareholders, the 
other two measure the degree of board independence based on family relationships. We find a 
positive and significant coefficient for FAM_CEO/OWNER. In other words, we document that when 
the CEO is also a member of the largest family, auditors increase their effort. Thus, our empirical 
findings support the idea that, because of the family relationship, these shareholders no longer act as 
independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’ decisions, thus increasing agency costs. 
We further find empirical support for H5a. Auditor effort is decreasing in the proportion of 
board members related to the largest family owner (FAM_BOARD/OWNER), consistent with fewer 
agency conflicts between family owners and the board. Finally, the empirical results indicate that 
audit effort is increasing in the proportion of board members related to the CEO 
                                               
21
 The estimated coefficient on INDSPEC is negative. The Pearson correlation between audit fees and INDSPEC is 
significantly positive (0.109) and the negative regression coefficient is likely caused by correlation with the firm size 
controls and BIG4 (i.e., INDSPEC is positive and significant when the model is estimated on a subset of firms with non-
Big 4 auditors). In addition, CHLEV has the opposite sign of expectations. No inferences are affected if we exclude that 
(or any other) control variable from the test. 
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(FAM_BOARD/CEO). This finding is consistent with the loss of board independence when family 
relationships exist between the CEO and board members. Thus, to control for the increase in agency 
conflicts, auditors exert more effort.22 
In the second column of Table 3 we report results of regressions in which we replace 
continuous test variables with indicator variables equal to one when equal to or above the mean, 
zero otherwise. Results are similar for five the six tests. For FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4a), the 
coefficients changes from significantly positive to only marginally significant (t = 1.56). 
In the next six columns, we provide results with one test variable included at a time. We 
note two differences from the full model results: OWNER_SECOND is no longer significant and 
FAM_CEO/OWNER is now significantly negative (as opposed to significantly positive). These 
differences highlight the importance of testing for multiple agency settings simultaneously. As we 
discussed previously, prior studies have been limited to looking at one or a few agency variables 
because of data limitations. We are able to provide detailed tests of six agency settings. Thus, we 
base our primary conclusions on the full model, which we believe better controls for multiple 
agency settings. 
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 To assess the economic significance of our results, we conduct two tests. First, we consider the effect of a change 
from the first to the third quartile of the distribution of our test variables (holding other variables constant). The effect 
for each translates into approximately NOK 1,000 or NOK 6,000 in total. While this does not appear to be a large 
amount, note again that the sample firms in our study are very small compared with those examined in prior research. 
For example, using data from Statistics Norway, the aggregate effect is equivalent to 18.8 man-hours based on average 
salaries for full-time employed “senior officials and managers in professional, scientific, and technical activities,” which 
includes auditors. Compared with all full-time employed persons in Norway (in the professional, scientific, and 
technical activities), the aggregate effect is equivalent to 34.9 (27.3) man-hours. In addition, we also compare these 
effects directly with the average audit fees in our sample. The average effect for our test variables is 4.7% and in 
aggregate the effect is 28.5% of average fees. Second, we compare the effects of the test variables with those of the 
control variables. In order to conduct such a comparison, we first standardize the estimated coefficients so that they are 
all directly comparable. Consistent with many prior studies, firm size is clearly the most important determinant of fees 
as well as the demand for a Big 4 auditor. However, for the fee regressions, in untabulated analyses we observe that 
OWNER_SECOND has an equal or greater effect than 12 of the other control variables. The other test variables also fare 
quite well in such a comparison. Overall we conclude that, although firm size is economically more significant than our 
test variables, the test variables have a non-trivial effect on both audit effort and audit demand. 
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6.2.2 Demand for High-Quality Auditor Tests 
In Table 4 we report results of the analyses that measure the demand for higher-quality 
auditing by firms/owners to reduce agency conflicts. As predicted in H1b, H2b, and H5b, we observe 
negative and significant coefficients on the three variables that capture non-CEO-related agency 
conflicts: OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, and FAM_BOARD/OWNER. These results are 
consistent with those obtained when testing audit fees (or auditor effort). In contrast, the coefficient 
for OWNER_CEO is negative, as predicted in H3b, but not significant.  
For our two CEO family-related variables, FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4b) and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6b), we find no significant evidence that the demand for a Big 4 auditor is 
affected when a family relationship exists between the CEO and major shareholder or as the number 
of board members related to the CEO increases. One interpretation of these insignificant 
coefficients is that, while hiring a higher-quality auditor may bring value to the firm as a whole (in 
part by reducing agency conflicts), CEOs in these family-relationship settings may perceive that the 
additional costs of hiring a Big 4 auditor is not necessary. Major shareholders and board members 
could believe that independent verification of a CEO family member is not warranted, allowing firm 
value to increase through reduced audit fees. In addition, the CEO may have personal incentives not 
to demand a Big 4 auditor to the extent that these external monitors make it more difficult for the 
CEO (or the CEO’s family) to extract resources from the firm. Thus, we attribute the weaker 
relation between BIG4 and our CEO family-related agency variables to the trade-off that exists 
when deciding the net benefits to hiring a Big 4 auditor. These trade-offs are less apparent when 
CEO family-related agency settings are not considered. We conclude that firms demand greater 
audit quality in the presence of agency conflicts (that are not CEO family-related).23,24 
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 Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree (2009) model the “match” (or “misalignment”) between the audit firm and its client 
and use this binary variable in their empirical tests. Our regressions include proxies for all the variables included in their 
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We then provide results using indicator variables for the test variables (measured as above) 
in Column 2. Results are similar to those using continuous measures, except that OWNER_CEO 
changes from insignificantly negative (t = −1.26) to significantly negative (t = −3.45), consistent 
with H3b. The remaining columns tabulate results with test variables included one at a time. 
Whereas FAM_CEO/OWNER and FAM_BOARD/CEO were insignificant in the full model, they are 
now significantly negative. These differences from the full model again highlight an advantage of 
controlling for multiple agency variables to provide more complete inferences. 
 
6.3 Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Tests (Untabulated) 
6.3.1. Additional Controls for Firm Size 
In our tabulated analyses, we include two explicit controls for client firm size (LNSALES and 
LNEMPLOY). We also include additional variables that relate to size, including BIG4, FOREIGN, 
LNSUB, ACQUISITIONS, and CITY. However, given the potential importance of firm size as a 
control variable, we conduct a number of additional tests. First, we replace LNEMPLOY (or 
LNSALES) with log of total assets in the audit fee model. Second, to test for non-linear size effects, 
we add square root terms of both LNSALES and LNEMPLOY to the model. Third, we add the square 
of both the size variables. Fourth, we include interaction terms between the size controls and all 
variables included in the model. Fifth, as a related test, we either break our size controls into 
quintiles and introduce them separately as controls, or we include these as both main and interacting 
                                                                                                                                                            
model (i.e., LNSALES; LNEMPLOY; ACQUISITIONS; CHLEV; INCPIC; DECPIC; GROWTH). No inferences are 
affected if we replace the individual control variables with a binary variable computed following Landsman et al.’s 
approach. 
24
 The change in the probability of a firm choosing a Big 4 auditor increases by 55.5 % (i.e., from 0.076 to 0.13) when 
all six test variables change from the third to first quartile (holding all other variables constant at their mean values). 
The percentage changes in the probability of a firm choosing a Big 4 auditor vary between 2.4 % and 24.5 % for the six 
variables. We further observe that, using standardized coefficients, OWNER_SECOND has a greater effect than all non-
size control variables. Again, the other test variables continue do compare well. 
  
29
effects in the model. Finally, we exclude the smallest 10% of firms (based on sales). In all these 
tests, results are consistent with those tabulated. 
 
6.3.2. Big 6 instead of Big 4 
As the Big 4 audit firms have a relatively small market share among private firms (18.1 
percent in our sample), as an additional test we replace Big 4 with Big 6. Specifically, in addition to 
the international Big 4 firms we also include two other large audit firms: BDO Noraudit and Inter 
Revisjon. Combined, the Big 6 firms have a market share of 29.9 percent. In fact, BDO Noraudit 
and Inter Revisjon are the two largest audit firms in terms of number of private client firms in 
Norway, with Ernst & Young and PWC close behind. 
We first repeat the auditor effort tests of Table 3 by replacing BIG4 with BIG6 in the audit 
fee model. No inferences are affected.25 More importantly, we redo the auditor demand test in Table 
4 using Big 6 as the dependent variable. Again, results are quite similar.26 
 
6.3.4. Non-linearity of CEO Ownership 
To explore the possibility that the effect of CEO ownership is non-linear, we add the square 
root of CEO ownership to the models. We first note that adding this variable does not affect the 
inferences for the other variables and further observe that the square root variable is negative and 
marginally statistically significant for the effort regression. Thus, there is some support of a non-
linear relation for CEO ownership.  
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 As an alternative to controlling for Big 4 in the audit fee model, we run the auditor effort tests separately for Big 4 
and non-Big 4 client firms. Although this is not one of our hypotheses, it is interesting to note that four of the six 
estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude for the Big 4 than for the non-Big 4 subsample. This observation is 
consistent with Big 4 firms being more sophisticated than other audit firms and thus responding more strongly to 
variations in agency conflicts. 
26
 Specifically, in this specification OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, and FAM_BOARD/OWNER remain 
significant in the hypothesized direction, while OWNER_CEO is now significantly negative (as predicted in H3b) and 
FAM_CEO/OWNER also becomes significantly negative (as discussed in H4b). 
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6.3.5. Controls for CEO Compensation 
Executives can extract rents from the company by also receiving excessive compensation. 
We test if our results are robust to controlling for CEO compensation by including either raw CEO 
compensation or CEO compensation scaled by firm size. No inferences are affected in these tests.  
 
6.3.6. Time Period Effects 
In the aftermath of well-known international accounting scandals and the introduction of 
SOX in the U.S., changes were made to Norwegian accounting and auditing regulations that were 
aimed at increasing accounting and audit quality. The changes took effect between the two periods 
covered in our sample. Even though we control for time-period effects through year fixed effects, 
we separately examine the time periods 2000-2002 and 2006-2007 in order to assess if the relations 
have changed. We find almost identical results across the two periods. The only difference is that 
OWNER_CONC is not significant in the earlier time period for the audit fee test (H1a). Overall, our 
robustness tests corroborate the main findings tabulated in the paper. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This study provides empirical evidence of agency conflicts associated with ownership 
characteristics and family relationships for private firms in the Norwegian market. Using a detailed 
data set obtained by special permission from the government, we are able to measure ultimate 
ownership concentration, ultimate ownership of the second largest shareholder and of the CEO, and 
family relationships among owners, board members, and CEOs for all Norwegian private limited 
liability firms. These data allow us to simultaneously test multiple sources of agency conflicts. 
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We first test for the extent of agency conflicts using audit fees. Controlling for a large 
number of client-firm and audit-firm characteristics, we predict and find that ownership 
characteristics and family relationships explain audit fees. Specifically, we find that audit fees 
decrease (i.e., audit effort decreases) as ownership concentration increases and as the proportion of 
shares held by the second largest shareholder increases. The first result is consistent with greater 
ownership concentration alleviating agency costs between shareholders and the managers (i.e., 
vertical agency costs). Larger shareholders can more efficiently monitor managers. The second 
result is consistent with reduced agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (i.e., horizontal agency costs). A second large shareholder serves as a monitor of a 
controlling shareholder who potentially has the ability to extract private benefits from minority 
shareholders. 
Related to the CEO, we find that as CEO ownership increases, audit fees decrease. This is 
consistent with increased ownership aligning the incentives of the CEO with those of the firms’ 
other stakeholders. In contrast, holding CEO ownership constant, we find that when the CEO is a 
member of the largest owning family, audit fees increase (i.e., auditor effort increases). This finding 
suggests that shareholders are less likely to act as independent monitors of the CEO when a family 
relationship exists, increasing the probability of misappropriation by the CEO or extraction of 
private benefits by controlling owners. 
For board independence, we find that audit fees decrease as the proportion of board 
members from the largest owning family increases. This finding reflects the likelihood that those 
inside the firm (board members) are more likely to act as effective monitors on behalf of those 
outside the firm (controlling owners) when a family relation exists. We also find that boards seem to 
lose their independence as the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases. This 
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result follows from the natural expectation that family relationships with the CEO impair the 
oversight responsibility of the board. 
As our second test, we consider each of our agency settings and the firm’s demand for a Big 
4 auditor. Consistent with results found for the auditor effort tests, the demand for a Big 4 auditor 
decreases with ownership concentration, level of ownership by the second largest owner, and family 
relationships between the board and the largest owner. We find no relation between demand for a 
Big 4 auditor and CEO ownership for our main tests but we do in sensitivity tests. Finally, for our 
two CEO family-related agency cost settings, we observe no impact on the demand for a Big 4 
auditor when the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members 
related to the CEO increases. These insignificant relations likely reflect a trade-off between the 
benefits of more credible reporting from using a Big 4 auditor versus the potential costs of increased 
fees associated with a Big 4 auditor and the reduced ability of the CEO (or the CEO’s family) to 
extract resources from the firm. 
Our research makes a contribution by providing a detailed investigation of the agency 
settings for private firms. Several differences exist between private and public firms, and results for 
one group are not necessarily expected to be the same as those for the other. In addition, in 
aggregate private firms provide the majority of economic activity throughout the world. We obtain a 
unique database for private firms in Norway to provide tests of the impact of ownership 
characteristics and family relationships on agency conflicts. This database entails combining 
ownership characteristics and family relationships using social security numbers, available only 
through special permission from the government. 
There is ample opportunity for future research to further explore the issues we examine in 
this study. Perhaps the most obvious suggestion would be to test for economic consequences of 
variations in the agency conflicts and/or audit variables that we consider. Another possibility is to 
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make further use of the register data available through linking databases using social security 
numbers. For example, auditor independence issues could be examined by considering auditors’ 
personal income and wealth. Other research could make use of interesting aspects of alternative 
institutional environments, or use research methods other than archival data to explore agency 
conflicts in private firms. 
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Appendix: Definitions of Variables  
Test variables  
OWNER_CONC  = Herfindahl ownership concentration ratio in year t based on ultimate 
ownership. 
OWNER_SECOND  = Fraction of shares held by the second largest owner in year t using 
ultimate ownership.  
OWNER_CEO = Fraction of shares held by the CEO in year t, based on ultimate 
ownership.  
FAM_CEO/OWNER = 1 if the CEO is related to the largest ultimate family owners through 
blood or marriage.  
FAM_BOARD/OWNER = Family influence on the board in year t computed as the number of 
board members from the largest owning family divided by the total 
number of board members. 
FAM_BOARD/CEO = Family relationships between the CEO and board members, defined 
as the number of family members of the CEO on the board divided 
by the total number of board members.  
 
Other variables  
ACQUISITIONS = 1 if the firm has increased long-term investments in other companies 
from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise. 
AGE = Firm’s age in year t measured as number of years since incorporation.  
BIG4 = 1 if the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 auditing firms or their 
forerunners in year t, 0 otherwise.  
CHAUDITOR = 1 if the firm changed auditor in year t, 0 otherwise 
CHCEO = 1 if the firm appointed a new CEO in year t, 0 otherwise 
CHGAAP = 1 if the firm has changed from simplified GAAP to regular GAAP or 
from regular GAAP to simplified GAAP during year t.  
CHLEV = Change in interest bearing debt from t−1 to t = LEVt − LEVt-1. 
CITY = 1 if firm is located in a city, 0 otherwise.  
COUNTYc = 1 if firm is located in county c, 0 otherwise (c = 0, 1, ..19).  
CURRATIO = Current ratio at the end of year t. 
DECPIC = 1 if the firm decreased share capital from t−1 to t, 0 otherwise.  
EMPLOY = Number of employees in year t is estimated as sum wages in year t 
divided by the average salary for full time male and female workers in 
year t if sum wages > 0, 0 otherwise. Data on average salary is taken 
from Statistics Norway. 
EXANTEFIN = Operating cash flow less net investments in tangible and intangible 
fixed assets scaled by current assets in year t. As in Knechel et al. 
(2008) we use a square root transformation of the ratio multiplied by −1 
if the unadjusted ratio was negative. Operating cash flow is estimated 
as operating income + depreciation + impairment − change in accounts 
receivables − change in inventory + change in accounts payable − 
change in taxes payable. Net investments in intangible and tangible 
fixed assets is estimated as change in intangible and fixed assets during 
the year plus depreciation and impairment since cash flow statements 
are not available.  
FEE = Audit fee in NOK 1,000, computed as the total fee paid to the auditor 
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for auditing services in year t. 
FOREIGN = Percentage of foreign subsidiaries in year t = the number of foreign 
subsidiaries in year t * 100 / total number of subsidiaries in year t. 
FYE = 1 for fiscal years ending other than December 31 in year t, 0 otherwise. 
GAAP = 1 if firm uses regular GAAP in year t and 0 otherwise.  
GROWTH = Change in sales in year t = (SALESt - SALESt−1) / SALESt−1. 
INCPIC = 1 if the firm increased share capital from t−1 to t, 0 otherwise. 
INDi = 1 if firm belongs to industry i, 0 otherwise. Two-digit industry codes 
are used to classify firms into industries. Firms in industries with 30 or 
less observations in a given year are reclassified to industry 99.  
INDUSTRIAL = 1 if industrial investors own 20% or more of the firm based on ultimate 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
INSTITUTIONAL = 1 if institutional investors own 20 % or more of the firm based on 
ultimate ownership, 0 otherwise 
INTANG = Intangible assets at the end of year t scaled by SALESt.  
INTERNATIONAL = 1 if international investors own 20 % or more of the firm based on 
ultimate ownership, 0 otherwise 
INVESTMENTS = (Long and short term investments in securities + bank deposits + cash)t 
scaled by SALESt.  
INVREC = Inventory and accounts receivable at the end of year t scaled by SALESt.  
LASTYRAUDIT = 1 in year t if the firm changed auditor in year t+1, 0 otherwise. 
LEV = Long- and short-term interest bearing debt / total assets, both at the end 
of year t. Short-term interest bearing debt = total short term debt − 
accounts payable − dividends − taxes payable − VAT and social service 
taxes − other short term debt.  
LNEMPLOY = Natural logarithm of 1+ number of employees = ln(1 + EMPLOYt). 
LNFEE = Natural logarithm of total fees paid to the auditor for auditing services 
in year t = ln(FEEt). 
LNSALES = Natural logarithm of total revenue from operations = ln(SALESt). 
LNSUB = Natural logarithm of 1 + number of subsidiaries in year t. 
LNTA =  Natural logarithm of total assets = ln(TAt) 
LOSS = 1 if net income after taxes before extraordinary item and taxes on 
extraordinary item < 0 in year t−1, 0 otherwise.  
MODOPINONS = The number of deviations from a clean audit report. The contents of the 
audit report are categorized into different deviations from the audit 
report, and up to 4 deviations are registered for each firm (i.e., the 
variable goes from 0 to 4).  
NOIND = Number of two digit industry codes the firm is registered with in year t. 
ROA = Return on assets = Earnings before interest, taxes, and extraordinary 
items in year t scaled by (TAt-1 + TAt) * 0.5  
SALES = Total revenue from operating activities in year t in NOK 1,000.  
STATE = 1 if the state owns 20 % or more of the firm based on ultimate 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
UNITEMS = 1 for firms with impairments or extraordinary items in year t, 0 
otherwise.  
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UNSECURED = Unsecured debt measured as property, plant and equipment less total 
debt scaled by total assets, measured at end of year t.  
YRy = 1 if observations belong to year y, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Private and public limited liability companies 136,140 138,745 141,146 141,991 144,426 157,710 180,709 192,011 1,232,878 
Exclusion criteria:          
Public limited liability companies 582 571 529 492 463 459 471 384 3,951 
Operating revenue less than 800,000 NOK 55,180 56,092 57,081 56,142 55,151 64,325 81,038 87,257 512,266 
Total assets less than 800,000 NOK 14,218 13,747 13,836 14,286 14,427 14,598 13,933 13,652 112,697 
Missing information on audit fees, audit fees less than 3,000 NOK,
or unknown auditor 2,465 2,239 2,034 71,071 74,385 78,328 13,904 2,831 247,257 
Missing information (e.g. industry affiliation, founding date, prior 
year financial statement) or firm using IFRS 6,419 7,400 6,862 0 0 0 9,252 11,690 41,623 
Subsidiaries 11,088 12,131 12,199 0 0 0 16,274 25,242 76,934 
Information on family ownership not available 7,439 6,134 7,058 0 0 0 8,421 8,635 37,687 
Aggregate ownership less than 50% 238 381 420 0 0 0 266 383 1,688 
Controlled by unspecified owners or by the State 1,298 724 678 0 0 0 781 693 4,174 
Observations with absolute value of studentized residuals greater 
than two 1,898 2,008 2,079 0 0 0 1,694 1,814 9,493 
Sample size  35,315 37,318 38,370 0 0 0 34,675 39,431 185,109 
 
Note that the data provider does not provide a breakdown of audit remuneration into audit fees and non-audit fees for the years 2003, 2004, and 
2005. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distribution of variables (N = 185,109) 
  Mean St.dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Corporate governance        
OWNER_CONC 0.605 0.296 0.194 0.355 0.500 1 1 
OWNER_SECOND 0.219 0.184 0 0 0.226 0.35 0.5 
OWNER_CEO 0.492 0.370 0 0.143 0.5 0.923 1 
FAM_CEO/OWNER 0.706 0.455 0 0 1 1 1 
FAM_BOARD/OWNER 0.712 0.341 0 0.4 1 1 1 
FAM_BOARD/CEO 0.151 0.268 0 0 0 0.333 0.667 
INSTITUTIONS 0.012 0.108 0 0 0 0 0 
STATE 0.003 0.053 0 0 0 0 0 
INTERNATIONAL 0.010 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 
INDUSTRIAL 0.011 0.106 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial variables        
ACQUISITIONS 0.047 0.213 0 0 0 0 0 
CHLEV −0.007 0.143 −0.221 −0.055 0 0.019 0.242 
CURRATIO 1.679 1.727 0.401 0.968 1.246 1.772 4.067 
DECPIC 0.012 0.111 0 0 0 0 0 
EXANTEFIN 0.237 0.686 −0.871 −0.241 0.357 0.591 1.222 
FEE 21.452 17.930 7 12 17 25 49 
GROWTH 0.279 1.080 −0.307 −0.038 0.069 0.236 1.150 
INCPIC 0.066 0.248 0 0 0 0 1 
INTANG 0.020 0.066 0 0 0 0.006 0.109 
INVESTMENTS 0.326 0.784 0.006 0.036 0.111 0.272 1.215 
INVREC 0.181 0.170 0 0.061 0.147 0.249 0.487 
LEV 0.267 0.286 0 0 0.180 0.457 0.832 
LNFEE 2.868 0.602 1.946 2.485 2.833 3.219 3.892 
LOSS 0.214 0.410 0 0 0 0 1 
ROA 0.160 0.212 −0.131 0.042 0.124 0.256 0.561 
SALES 16,242.9 182,098.9 1,096.0 2,523.0 5,020.0 11,186.0 43,862.0 
TA 13,860.4 133,659.0 935.0 1,621.0 3,139.0 7,185.0 32,575.0 
UNITEMS 0.036 0.186 0 0 0 0 0 
UNSECURED −0.272 0.286 −0.884 −0.452 −0.153 −0.037 0.000 
Other variables        
AGE 12.814 12.100 2 5 10 16 33 
EMPLOY 9.434 61.611 0 1.605 3.669 7.648 26.717 
BIG4 0.181 0.385 0 0 0 0 1 
CHAUDITOR 0.083 0.276 0 0 0 0 1 
CHCEO 0.051 0.219 0 0 0 0 1 
CHGAAP 0.006 0.077 0 0 0 0 0 
CITY 0.558 0.497 0 0 1 1 1 
FOREIGN 0.015 0.120 0 0 0 0 0 
FYE 0.001 0.028 0 0 0 0 0 
GAAP 0.036 0.187 0 0 0 0 0 
INDSPEC 0.027 0.064 0 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.175 
LASTYRAUDIT 0.084 0.277 0 0 0 0 1 
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MODOPINONS 0.287 0669 0 0 0 0 2 
NOIND 1.514 0.843 1 1 1 2 3 
SUB 0.267 1.507 0 0 0 0 1 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Spearman correlation coefficients (N = 185,109) 
 Variables: LNFEE 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   
1 BIG4 0.092 * 
2 OWNER_CONC -0.121 * -0.050 * 
3 OWNER_SECOND 0.015 * -0.030 * -0.572 * 
4 OWNER_CEO -0.084 * -0.052 * 0.589 * -0.369 * 
5 FAM_CEO/OWNER -0.044 * -0.042 * 0.286 * -0.135 * 0.663 * 
6 FAM_BOARD/OWNER -0.171 * -0.062 * 0.493 * -0.227 * 0.376 * 0.416 * 
7 FAM_BOARD/CEO 0.029 * 0.002 -0.107 * 0.138 * -0.031 * 0.342 * 0.273 * 
8 GROWTH -0.053 * -0.006 * -0.023 * 0.012 * -0.015 * -0.022 * -0.039 * -0.038 * 
9 LEV -0.001 0.015 * -0.012 * -0.002 -0.042 * -0.012 * -0.001 -0.040 * -0.015 * 
10 LOSS 0.013 * 0.010 * -0.011 * -0.016 * -0.022 * -0.021 * -0.041 * -0.065 * 0.037 * 0.251 * 
11 ROA -0.101 * -0.032 * 0.044 * 0.026 * 0.054 * 0.029 * 0.065 * 0.305 * -0.107 * -0.397 * -0.273 * 
12 SALES 0.609 * 0.082 * -0.130 * 0.035 * -0.068 * -0.038 * -0.189 * -0.129 * 0.171 * -0.087 * -0.063 * 0.017 * 
13 UNSECURED 0.062 * -0.011 * 0.009 * 0.010 * 0.043 * 0.004 -0.045 * -0.104 * 0.317 * -0.524 * -0.062 * 0.190 * 0.130 * 
14 EMPLOY 0.549 * 0.051 * -0.149 * 0.051 * -0.056 * -0.030 * -0.220 * -0.173 * 0.184 * -0.122 * -0.050 * -0.028 * 0.772 * 0.082 * 
 
The table reports Spearman correlation coefficients between dependent variables and tests and main control variables. The sample is described in 
Table 1 and variables are defined in the Appendix. * denotes significant correlation coefficient at p<0.01.  
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TABLE 3 
OLS Regression of Audit Fees on Test Variables and Control Variables 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OWNER_CONC (H1a) − −0.032*** −0.024*** −0.039***      
  (−4.16) (−5.22) (−8.37)      
OWNER_SECOND (H2a) − −0.070*** −0.032***  0.004     
  (−7.15) (−7.56)  (0.63)     
OWNER_CEO (H3a) − −0.030*** −0.023***   −0.034***    
  (−5.20) (−6.82)   (−9.01)    
FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4a) +/– 0.012*** 0.007*    −0.009***   
  (3.11) (1.79)    (−3.16)   
FAM_BOARD/OWNER (H5a) − −0.038*** −0.021***     −0.039***  
  (−7.83) (−6.83)     (−9.52)  
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6a) +/– 0.028*** 0.017***      0.020*** 
  (4.91) (5.24)      (3.98) 
          
LNSALES + 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 
  (97.16) (97.36) (97.93) (98.34) (97.86) (98.14) (97.70) (98.38) 
LNEMPLOY + 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 
  (53.56) (53.70) (54.12) (54.59) (54.47) (54.59) (53.81) (54.58) 
LEV + 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
  (13.67) (13.60) (13.63) (13.62) (13.56) (13.62) (13.62) (13.57) 
CHLEV + −0.064*** −0.064*** −0.066*** −0.066*** −0.065*** −0.066*** −0.065*** −0.066*** 
  (−8.66) (−8.66) (−8.88) (−8.90) (−8.83) (−8.90) (−8.81) (−8.87) 
INVREC + 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.265*** 
  (32.36) (32.44) (32.61) (32.82) (32.74) (32.81) (32.44) (32.84) 
GROWTH + −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** 
  (−43.35) (−43.34) (−43.22) (−43.27) (−43.34) (−43.31) (−43.39) (−43.22) 
ROA − −0.153*** −0.154*** −0.160*** −0.162*** −0.159*** −0.161*** −0.157*** −0.161*** 
  (−23.62) (−23.85) (−24.75) (−25.10) (−24.67) (−24.96) (−24.37) (−25.06) 
INCPIC + 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 
  (16.01) (16.21) (16.69) (17.20) (16.83) (17.09) (16.53) (17.26) 
DECPIC + 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 
  (10.67) (10.73) (11.14) (11.35) (11.18) (11.30) (10.95) (11.37) 
INTANG + 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 
  
46
  (4.89) (4.97) (5.18) (5.35) (5.24) (5.32) (5.14) (5.37) 
UNITEMS + 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
  (12.22) (12.25) (12.22) (12.21) (12.24) (12.23) (12.23) (12.22) 
NOIND + 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
  (18.76) (18.66) (18.90) (18.75) (18.82) (18.80) (18.96) (18.65) 
FOREIGN + 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 
  (8.43) (8.51) (8.57) (8.66) (8.62) (8.63) (8.48) (8.70) 
LNSUB + 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
  (9.20) (9.10) (9.18) (8.99) (8.99) (8.99) (9.20) (8.96) 
FYE + 0.117** 0.117** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.120** 0.128*** 0.118** 0.130*** 
  (2.43) (2.45) (2.66) (2.66) (2.51) (2.66) (2.47) (2.69) 
INVESTMENTS + 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
  (31.22) (31.17) (31.63) (31.45) (31.28) (31.45) (31.74) (31.31) 
ACQUISITIONS + 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
  (11.36) (11.43) (11.53) (11.57) (11.57) (11.57) (11.42) (11.58) 
LOSS + 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 
  (16.30) (16.42) (16.86) (17.05) (16.85) (16.97) (16.52) (17.11) 
CURRATIO + 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (1.86) (1.92) (2.16) (2.31) (2.16) (2.28) (2.23) (2.25) 
BIG4 + 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
  (21.19) (21.21) (21.50) (21.61) (21.46) (21.57) (21.41) (21.61) 
GAAP ? −0.074*** −0.074*** −0.074*** −0.075*** −0.076*** −0.075*** −0.073*** −0.075*** 
  (−7.13) (−7.15) (−7.13) (−7.20) (−7.27) (−7.22) (−7.05) (−7.20) 
CHGAAP + 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 
  (5.65) (5.66) (5.75) (5.82) (5.75) (5.80) (5.72) (5.82) 
INDSPEC + −0.390*** −0.390*** −0.390*** −0.394*** −0.391*** −0.394*** −0.392*** −0.393*** 
  (−11.67) (−11.64) (−11.64) (−11.70) (−11.64) (−11.69) (−11.67) (−11.67) 
CHUDITOR + 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
  (1.67) (1.71) (1.70) (1.67) (1.65) (1.68) (1.67) (1.67) 
LASTYRAUDIT +/− 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.24) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) 
MODOPINIONS + 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
  (18.69) (18.61) (18.28) (17.63) (18.02) (17.70) (18.19) (17.67) 
CHCEO +/− 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 
  (4.61) (5.10) (6.53) (7.17) (4.99) (6.49) (6.03) (7.17) 
CITY + 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
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  (18.73) (18.76) (18.77) (18.63) (18.66) (18.60) (18.51) (18.73) 
Constant  0.376*** 0.349*** 0.317*** 0.282*** 0.311*** 0.292*** 0.327*** 0.278*** 
  (14.61) (13.86) (12.74) (11.53) (12.60) (11.86) (13.12) (11.38) 
County fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 
Adjusted R2  0.529 0.529 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 
 
This table presents OLS−regression coefficients (t−values in parentheses) for the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships on 
audit fees. The dependent variable is LNFEE, the natural log of audit fees in NOK 1,000. The sample is described in Table 1 and variables are 
defined in the Appendix except for the test variables in Model 2 which are measured as indicator variables defined as 1 if the test variable is 
greater than or equal to the mean and 0 otherwise. County, industry, and year fixed effects are included but omitted from table to conserve space. 
All regressions employ robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels (two−sided), respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
Logit Regressions of Choice of Big 4 Auditor on Ownership, CEO, and Board Characteristics, as well as Control Variables 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OWNER_CONC (H1b) − −0.227*** −0.096*** −0.078**      
  (−4.16) (−2.89) (−2.22)      
OWNER_SECOND (H2b) − −0.753*** −0.258***  −0.357***     
  (−10.06) (−8.70)  (−6.58)     
OWNER_CEO (H3b) − −0.052 −0.087***   −0.106***    
  (−1.26) (−3.45)   (−3.81)    
FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4b) +/– −0.027 −0.023    −0.109***   
  (−0.93) (−0.88)    (−5.27)   
FAM_BOARD/OWNER (H5b) − −0.219*** −0.139***     −0.248***  
  (−6.04) (−5.96)     (−8.35)  
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6b) +/– 0.027 0.010      −0.119*** 
  (0.61) (0.39)      (−3.06) 
 
LNTA + 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.357*** 0.360*** 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.347*** 0.361*** 
  (34.58) (35.12) (37.49) (38.21) (37.18) (37.69) (36.53) (38.32) 
LEV + −0.442*** −0.450*** −0.467*** −0.465*** −0.466*** −0.468*** −0.466*** −0.473*** 
  (−9.92) (−10.11) (−10.49) (−10.47) (−10.48) (−10.54) (−10.46) (−10.63) 
UNSECURED + 0.361*** 0.365*** 0.381*** 0.384*** 0.380*** 0.377*** 0.361*** 0.378*** 
  (7.84) (7.92) (8.29) (8.37) (8.28) (8.21) (7.82) (8.21) 
LOSS ? 0.130*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 
  (7.24) (7.39) (8.27) (8.19) (8.17) (8.14) (7.76) (8.26) 
FOREIGN + 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.327*** 0.337*** 
  (4.23) (4.26) (4.52) (4.48) (4.52) (4.49) (4.33) (4.47) 
EXANTEFIN + 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
  (3.37) (3.43) (3.48) (3.53) (3.44) (3.44) (3.47) (3.53) 
INCPIC + −0.017 −0.011 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.009 −0.002 0.014 
  (−0.64) (−0.41) (0.44) (0.60) (0.41) (0.36) (−0.07) (0.54) 
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Table 4, continued 
ROA – −0.374*** −0.389*** −0.443*** −0.439*** −0.438*** −0.439*** −0.414*** −0.449*** 
  (−8.39) (−8.73) (−9.94) (−9.89) (−9.85) (−9.89) (−9.30) (−10.11) 
CITY + 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
  (3.21) (3.21) (3.31) (3.23) (3.28) (3.23) (3.15) (3.20) 
Constant  −4.300*** −4.523*** −4.945*** −4.945*** −4.917*** −4.902*** −4.731*** −5.002*** 
  (−25.84) (−28.01) (−31.07) (−31.71) (−31.17) (−31.24) (−29.79) (−32.16) 
Count fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 
Pseudo R2  0.101 0.101 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 
 
This table presents logistic regression coefficients (z−values in parentheses) for the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships 
on the choice of Big 4 auditors. The sample is described in Table 1 and variables are defined in the Appendix except for the test variables in 
Model 2 which are measured as indicator variables defined as 1 if the test variable is greater than or equal to mean and 0 otherwise. County, 
industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models but omitted from the table in order to conserve space. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are employed. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two−sided), respectively.  
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Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
 
Abstract 
We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through 
ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors’ increase of 
effort and firms’ choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large 
sample of private firms, we use unique and confidential data (obtained through special 
permission by the government) to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as 
well as extended family relationships (based on marriage and blood lines, going back four 
generations and extending out to fourth cousin) among all shareholders, board members, and 
CEOs. We first find that audit fees, our proxy for audit effort, vary as hypothesized with firm-
level characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Second, we find 
evidence that firms in higher agency cost settings respond by having their financial statements 
audited by a higher-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4 firm). However, for CEO family-related settings 
(i.e., where the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members 
related to the CEO increases), we find no evidence of a greater demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
 
Keywords: Agency conflicts, auditing, private firms, family relationships, ownership, audit 
effort, audit demand 
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Agency Conflicts and Auditing in Private Firms 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we seek to understand how ownership structures and family relationships 
influence agency costs in private firms. We do this by observing two aspects related to auditing. 
First, in higher agency cost settings, auditors are more likely to supply greater effort to prevent 
misstatement associated with moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We examine how 
auditors adjust their level of effort when auditing financial accounting information. Second, a subset 
of firms in higher agency cost settings likely have a greater demand to choose a higher-quality 
auditor to provide a credible signal of their commitment to higher-quality reporting. To test this, we 
examine the extent to which firms with various characteristics hire a Big 4 auditor. 
 Our examinations draw on very detailed data on ultimate ownership and extended family 
relationships provided by the Norwegian government. We find that audit fees (i.e., our proxy for 
auditor effort) increase with expected agency costs.1 Audit fees relate negatively to ownership 
concentration and to the extent of ownership by the second-largest shareholder. Concentrated 
ownership increases the likelihood that a large shareholder closely monitors managerial actions, and 
an influential second shareholder monitors potential expropriation by the largest shareholder. Audit 
fees also relate negatively to the portion of shares held by the CEO, consistent with ownership 
aligning the incentives of the CEO and other stakeholders. Audit fees are positively associated with 
family relationships between the CEO and the major shareholder (consistent with these family 
relationships indicating reduced monitoring). 
With respect to board independence, we find that audit fees decline as the number of board 
members related to the largest shareholder increases, consistent with fewer agency conflicts 
                                               
1
 The fee (or effort) regression includes controls for 24 client-firm characteristics, five audit-firm variables, as well as 
year and industry fixed effects. 
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between owners and the board. In contrast, as the number of board members related to the CEO 
increases, audit fees increase, suggesting less board independence and more agency conflicts. 
For our tests of demand for Big 4 auditor, we report two interesting sets of results. First, for 
agency settings that are not CEO family-related, we observe results consistent with those obtained 
for our auditor effort tests. Specifically, the propensity to hire a Big 4 auditor increases as 
ownership concentration decreases, ownership of the second largest owner decreases, and the major 
shareholder’s family influence on the board decreases. These results are consistent with the demand 
for a Big 4 auditor being greater in higher agency cost settings. In these settings, a higher-quality 
auditor plays a stronger role in reducing agency costs by sending a more credible signal of 
managers’ commitment to higher-quality reporting. We do not find significant evidence of a 
relation between hiring a Big 4 auditor and the fraction of shares owned by the CEO for our main 
tests, but we do in sensitivity tests. 
We find no association between the choice to hire a Big 4 auditor and CEO family-related 
agency variables. Specifically, we find no significant evidence that the demand for a Big 4 auditor 
is affected when a family relationship exists between the CEO and the major shareholder or as the 
number of board members related to the CEO increases. One explanation for the lack of 
significance could be that while some CEOs in family-related agency settings may wish to signal 
more credible reporting by hiring a Big 4 auditor, other CEOs in these settings may feel a Big 4 
auditor is either unnecessary given close family ties or unwanted because of the gains from 
extracting private benefits which could be reduced by a Big 4 audit.2 
                                               
2
 As per Norway’s Companies Act (§ 7-1), the annual meeting (or General Assembly) of the shareholders elects the 
auditor. While the selection of the auditor is technically the responsibility of the General Assembly (or in practice the 
board), it is almost certainly the case that the CEO plays a significant role in our setting. There is a large literature on 
how CEOs influence the selection of board members and more generally exercise “power” over the board (see, e.g., 
Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Even for large public firms in the U.S. and U.K. the CEO has an impact on which auditor is 
selected (e.g., Carcello, Neal, Palmrose, and Scholz 2011; Firth 1999; Beattie and Fearnley 1995). For our sample of 
smaller private firms, the CEO is expected to have a greater influence on auditor selection because the boards are 
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Our research is motivated by the need to understand agency conflicts facing private firms. 
Private firms make up a significant portion of the economic activity in Norway and nearly all other 
countries, yet prior research focuses primarily on public firms. Given the sometimes vast 
differences between public and private firms (e.g., Beatty, Ke, and Petroni 2002; Chaney, Jeter, and 
Shivakumar 2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005), it is not apparent without testing that results for 
public firms will generalize to private firms. Thus, private firms offer an economically important 
sample worth testing. While the benefits to understanding agency conflicts accrue directly to the 
firm’s investors, they will also be important to many other stakeholders (e.g., creditors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers), regulatory bodies supervising auditors and firms’ financial reporting, and 
society in general. 
A sample of private (as opposed to public) firms may also offer a stronger test of agency 
conflicts related to ownership structure and family relationships. As we discuss in more detail in 
Section 3, prior research sometimes provides conflicting evidence or conflicting predictions for the 
impact of ownership structures and family relationships on agency conflicts. Our study provides a 
potentially strong setting for testing agency conflicts because private firms exhibit heterogeneous 
ownership characteristics and family relationships. Public firms are more homogeneous, including 
wide-spread ownership, relatively low CEO ownership, and fewer family ties between managers 
and shareholders and between managers and board members. Private firms offer interesting 
ownership structures that potentially increase our understanding of the relation between agency 
conflicts and the supply of auditor effort. For example, private firms show considerable variation in 
ownership percentages by second largest shareholders. This allows us to provide a meaningful test 
of the impact of agency conflicts among shareholders (i.e., monitoring of largest shareholders by 
                                                                                                                                                            
typically smaller, CEO ownership is common (the CEO owns shares in 78% of our sample firms), and the largest owner 
often is related to the CEO. 
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second largest shareholders). Private firms also show greater variation in their choice of auditor 
(only 18.1 percent choose a Big 4 auditor). Nearly all public firms opt for a Big 4 auditor, limiting 
the ability to empirically test signaling through demand for a high-quality auditor. 
Related to tests of the supply of auditor effort, a single-country setting (Norway) controls for 
cross-country variation in audit practices and fees and the strength of legal institutions. Cross-
country differences could easily confound inferences. Norway also offers an environment where the 
impact of litigation on audit fees is relatively limited (Hope and Langli 2010). This increases our 
ability to make more reliable inferences from using audit fees to measure auditor effort, and adds to 
calls for research to better understand the role of firm governance in explaining audit fees (Hay, 
Knechel, and Wong 2006). 
Finally, given the unique data we use in this study, we are able to measure attributes of 
ownership structure and family relationships that have been difficult to measure in the past. 
Specifically, for all private limited liability firms we have detailed information available to compute 
both direct and ultimate ownership for each owner, board member, and CEO.3 In addition, we have 
detailed data on family relationships among all owners, board members, board chairs, and CEOs 
(based on both marriage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth 
cousin). To our knowledge, no prior study has been able to test the effects of family relationship 
using such detailed data. These data, based on merging databases using social security numbers, are 
obtained through special permission from the Norwegian government. Having these data allows us 
to simultaneously test multiple sources of agency conflicts in a single test. In contrast, prior studies, 
because of data limitations, have been able to focus only on a particular test variable (and thus leave 
out potentially important ownership and family details). The full model better controls for multiple 
                                               
3
 For example, suppose an investor owns 30 percent of firm A and 30 percent of firm B, and firm A in turn owns 30 
percent of firm B. The investor’s direct ownership in firm B is 30 percent, while her ultimate ownership is 39 percent. 
Note that our data also account for cross-holdings. 
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agency settings. We show that the ability to simultaneously test the association of these variables on 
auditor effort and firms’ selection of the auditor can affect conclusions in some cases. 
We next briefly discuss the importance of accounting and auditing, the role of auditing in 
private firms, and the importance of auditing in the private firm market. Section 3 provides 
hypotheses of the expected impact that agency conflicts have on the supply of auditor effort and the 
demand for a Big 4 auditor. Section 4 introduces our research design. Section 5 provides details on 
the data underlying our study. We present empirical results in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Background, Related Research, and Institutional Setting 
2.1 Importance of Auditing in Private Firm Setting 
An external audit plays a role in corporate governance by providing an independent 
assessment of the accuracy and fairness with which financial statements represent the results of 
operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. While researchers 
commonly consider the role of auditing for public firms, audits for private firms can also play a 
role. Private firms typically disclose less non-accounting information, potentially increasing the 
importance of financial accounting information to external providers of capital in monitoring 
managerial activities. In addition, managerial activities of public firms are partially constrained by 
market-based mechanisms. For example, public firms are more susceptible to takeovers, indicating 
that such mechanisms help control for agency conflicts (Lennox 2005). In the absence of market-
based measures of firm-value (and other sources of information such as financial analysts), high-
quality reporting may be particularly relevant for evaluation of managerial performance and to 
support personnel and compensation decisions (Indjejikian and Matejka 2009), resulting in a 
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demand for high-quality audits (Chaney et al. 2004).4  
 
2.2 Brief Review of Prior Research 
Although there is a huge auditing literature, there is relatively limited prior evidence on 
auditing issues in private firms.5 Some prior studies investigate private firms’ choice to have an 
audit. Carey, Simnett, and Tanewski (2000) find that nonfamily involvement correlates positively 
with the voluntary demand for auditing in Australian family businesses. Blackwell, Noland, and 
Winters (1998) find that private U.S. firms that elect to have their financial statements audited pay 
significantly lower interest rates than nonaudited private firms. Similarly, Allee and Yohn (2009) 
use National Survey of Small Business Finances data from 2003 to examine the financial reporting 
practices of small privately held U.S. businesses. They find that firms with audited financial 
statements enjoy greater access to credit. Using a large sample of private firms from the World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys, Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2011) show that firms which have their 
financial statements reviewed by an external auditor experience easier access to external financing 
and obtain those funds at lower costs.  
In a recent study, Lennox and Pittman (2011) make use of a natural experiment in the United 
Kingdom. Starting in 2004, an external audit is no longer required for private U.K. companies. 
                                               
4
 According to Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), a choice to contract for high-quality auditing (e.g., proxied by 
choosing a Big 4 auditing firm) could signal financial reporting quality and perhaps deter a rigorous tax audit in the 
private firm market. They further argue that private firms may also want to convince suppliers, clients, or employees of 
the credibility of their financial statements. This may be especially important in an environment like Norway where 
financial statements of all limited liability companies (public and private) are publicly available. To illustrate, most 
information from the income statements and the balance sheet, in addition to names and shareholdings of owners, 
CEOs, and board members, is freely available through websites (e.g., www.proff.no). Information on family 
relationships between owners, CEOs, and board members, however, is not publicity available. 
5
 The usefulness of accounting information for private firms has been shown in recent studies including Chen, Hope, Li, 
and Wang (2011) and Indjejikian and Matejka (2007). Chen et al. find that emerging market firms with higher financial 
reporting quality exhibit greater investment efficiency. Indjejikian and Matejka further show that accounting 
information is used in compensation contracting by U.S. private firms. Studies that compare the financial reporting 
quality of public and private firms include Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), Asker, 
Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011), and Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2012). 
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Lennox and Pittman focus on the firms that are audited under both regimes (i.e., the firms that 
reveal their preference to be audited). They find that these companies attract upgrades to their credit 
ratings. In contrast, companies that no longer submit to an audit suffer credit rating downgrades. 
These findings provide further support for the usefulness of auditing in a private firm setting. 
There is also research on how audit fees relate to ownership characteristics, primarily for 
publicly traded companies. For example, Chan, Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993) find that ownership 
control, defined in their study as “directors’ beneficial and non-beneficial shareholdings and all 
disclosed shareholdings in excess of five percent,” is negatively related to levels of audit fees for 
their full sample of 280 publicly traded U.K. companies from 1987. In contrast, they find no 
significant effect for smaller auditees (i.e., firms that are more similar to the private firms in our 
sample). 
Mitra, Hossain, and Deis (2007) examine 358 NYSE-listed manufacturing and retail 
companies that were audited by Big 5 auditors in year 2000 (i.e., firms that are very different from 
the small private firms in our sample). They document that audit fees are positively associated with 
diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) and 
negatively associated with institutional blockholder ownership (i.e., having 5% or more individual 
shareholding).  
Hay, Knechel, and Ling (2008) show that an indicator for whether there is a single 
shareholder who controls 20% or more of the company’s stock is positively related to audit fees for 
New Zealand public companies in 1995 (sample size: 130). However, there is no significant 
correlation in 2005 (sample size: 83). 
As discussed, almost all prior research is on public, not private firms. In addition, given that 
all private limited liability companies in Norway are audited during our sample period, voluntary 
demand for audits per se is not an issue for our study. The choice we examine is the demand for a 
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high-quality auditor (Big 4). Equally important, no prior study has employed detailed data on family 
relationships among shareholders, board members, and CEOs to measure agency conflicts, and to 
our knowledge few prior studies have as detailed measures of ownership as this study.6 Finally, in 
contrast to most prior research, we examine the effects of several agency cost related factors 
simultaneously. In sum, although there is sufficient extant research ensuring that we have 
theoretical support for our hypotheses, we believe our study fills a void by examining a large 
sample of private firms and testing for potentially important effects for which prior research has had 
limited data. 
 
2.3 Institutional Setting 
In Norway, external auditing of all private limited liability companies is mandated by the 
government. In the rest of Europe, only private companies that meet certain size criteria are required 
to have their financial statements audited.7 The statutory auditor is expected to provide different 
stakeholders of the company assurance concerning the accuracy of the financial statements, the non-
existence of financial statement fraud, and the going concern status (e.g., Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2008). 
Norwegian auditing standards follow International Standards of Auditing (ISA). The ISAs 
require auditors to assess several agency conflicts when assessing audit risk. For example, from ISA 
315, an auditor assesses risk of material misstatement by understanding the entity’s ownership and 
governance structures and the way that the entity is structured (paragraph 11). This could include 
noting whether the client firm has an owner-manager, more than one owner, dispersed ownership, 
                                               
6
 Lennox (2005) investigates the relation between management ownership and audit firm size among private U.K. 
companies.  
7
 Norway and Sweden were the two last countries in Europe that abandoned the requirement that all limited liability 
companies should disclose audited financial statements. Starting November 10, 2010 in Sweden and January 1, 2011 in 
Norway, the (very) smallest firms may decide not to engage an auditor.  
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etc.8 In addition, IAS 315 suggests that assessing risk involves understanding the relations between 
owners and other people, which likely includes family relationships (paragraph A23). Referring to 
the audits of smaller firms (which are much more likely to be private), IAS 315 states that the 
presence of an owner-manager may mitigate certain risks arising from a lack of segregation of 
duties (paragraph A76). We believe that our investigation of the relation between audit and 
ownership characteristics and family relationships provides a unique setting for understanding the 
interplay between agency conflicts and auditing in the private firm segment of the economy. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The framework for our tests can be understood by considering that there is a principal (i.e., 
the party for whom financial statements are prepared such as owners, creditors, regulators, 
suppliers, etc.) and two agents (the manager and the auditor). We observe the actions of these two 
agents – the manager’s demand for a Big 4 auditor and the auditor’s supply of effort – to understand 
the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships on agency costs. 
In the first principal-agent setting, the manager understands that her potentially suboptimal 
actions are unobservable to the principal, and therefore the principal will impose a monetary penalty 
on the manager. To avoid this penalty in high agency cost settings, the manager is willing to hire a 
higher-quality auditor to provide a more credible signal that financial statements are free of material 
misstatement and that the manager has committed to refrain from siphoning private benefits. 
Previous research suggests that larger auditors provide higher quality audits (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; 
Palmrose 1988) and that Big N auditors in particular provide higher-quality outcomes in a variety of 
settings (e.g., Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; DeFond 1992; Mansi, 
                                               
8
 Standard auditing textbooks provide further support. For example, Arens, Elder, and Beasley (2012) note that the 
distribution of ownership has the potential to affect audit risk. 
  
10
Maxwell, and Miller 2004). These arguments lead to the expectation that firms in higher agency 
cost settings are more likely to demand a Big 4 auditor. This is the typical principal-agent 
framework put forth in most auditor selection studies.9 
The second agency setting involves the auditor acting as an agent, having a preference for 
compensation and a disutility for effort. In other words, the optimal action for the auditor is to 
supply the minimum amount of effort needed to “obtain reasonable assurance about whether the 
financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error” 
(ISA 2010, paragraph 5). Doing so maximizes the auditor’s utility. The higher the audit effort is, the 
less likely type II errors occur in audit reports (e.g., Dye 1993; Laux and Newman 2010). Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Davis, Ricchiute, and Trompeter 1993; Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, 
and Raghunandan 2003), we measure auditor effort using audit fees. Due to transparency of the 
audit market and the large number of auditors and audit firms in Norway (Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway, Annual Report 2007), the market for auditing services is highly competitive. 
Audit fees should therefore reflect the effort assessed by the auditor in assuring the accuracy of 
financial statements.10 
                                               
9
 The obvious counterargument is that hiring a Big 4 auditor is more costly. For example, Chaney et al. (2004) conclude 
that U.K. private firms choose auditors that minimize their audit fees. However, they do not examine whether audit fees 
vary with agency conflicts as in our study. We contend that firms in higher agency cost settings are more willing to hire 
a Big 4 auditor (and incur the higher audit cost) because of the benefits received from signaling more credible reporting. 
10
 Some prior research in other settings suggests that it is important to distinguish the component of audit fees that also 
reflects compensation for litigation risk. We do not view this distinction important for our tests. In addition, both the 
litigation risk and reputation risk of auditors are relatively low for private firms in Norway. For a detailed discussion of 
this issue, see Hope and Langli (2010), who examine all court cases and other legal proceedings against auditors over a 
60-year period and conclude that auditors face much lower litigation risk in Norway than in other more litigious 
environments. It is important to note that, even in an environment with low litigation, there is still a role for agency 
costs. For example, debt and equity financing will be more costly when agency costs are high. To the extent that 
companies in settings with high agency problems are able to signal more credible reporting, financing will be less costly 
and more accessible. Firms can signal this credibility with an audit. As another example, suppliers may also be 
concerned about the viability of the firm when deciding whether to enter long-term contracts. To the extent that the 
supplier can adequately rely on financial reports to assess the firm’s long-run viability and stability, they are more 
willing to enter those contracts, increasing the operating efficiency and profitability of the firm (e.g., Dou, Hope, and 
Thomas 2012). 
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In the next section, we develop our six hypotheses. The first three focus on ownership 
characteristics – ownership concentration among all shareholders, ownership by second largest 
shareholder, and fraction of shares held by the CEO. The second three hypotheses focus on family 
relationships – family ties between the CEO and largest owning family, percentage of board 
members related to largest owning family, and family ties between the CEO and board members. 
For each of these six settings, we consider whether agency concerns affect managers’ decision to 
hire a Big 4 auditor or auditors’ supply of effort. 
 
3.1. Ownership Structures 
3.1.1. Ownership Concentration 
Prior research provides evidence that managers, when left unmonitored, are more likely to 
manage earnings, commit fraud, or make suboptimal investment decisions (e.g., Biddle and Hillary 
2006; Hope and Thomas 2008). Thus, shareholder monitoring is an important mechanism by which 
agency costs can be reduced. However, while all shareholders have the responsibility to monitor 
managerial activities, the benefits of doing so by any individual shareholder are proportional to the 
percentage of shares owned. As the percentage of ownership by individual shareholders increases 
(i.e., concentration increases), the more willing individual shareholders are to incur necessary 
monitoring costs. 
Monitoring by a large shareholder could take many forms. Perhaps the most commonly 
discussed means of monitoring discussed in the literature involves a large shareholder having a seat 
on the board. Several studies show in a variety of contexts the board’s role in monitoring managers 
(e.g., Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010; Beasley 1996; 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996; Byrd and Hickman 2002; Anderson, Mansi, and Reed 2004; 
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and Laksmana 2008, to name just a few).11 Other forms of direct monitoring would be a large 
shareholder actively participating in the firm’s operations or having routine meetings with 
managers. As the proportion of ownership increases, the more beneficial it is for large shareholders 
to engage in these types of costly direct monitoring activities. Large shareholders can also serve to 
block business decisions that may be considered suboptimal (e.g., aggressive expansion through 
negative net present value projects). Doing so involves an investment in time and expertise by the 
shareholder to understand the consequences of major business decisions. Large shareholders are 
also likely to have more control over the firm’s dividend (or capital distribution) policy, as a way to 
further discipline managers’ actions. 
When ownership is widely dispersed, it is economically less feasible for any individual 
shareholder to incur significant monitoring costs, because she will receive only a small portion of 
benefits. This is the typical “vertical agency cost” (e.g., Gogineni, Linn, and Yadav 2010) argument 
(i.e., conflicts between managers and owners) and leads to the prediction that agency costs are 
expected to be lower as ownership concentration increases.12 When agency costs are lower, we 
expect that auditors supply less effort and there is less demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
 
H1a: As ownership concentration increases, audit fees decrease.  
H1b: As ownership concentration increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.1.2 Second Largest Shareholder 
While the previous discussion explains the need for shareholders to monitor managers, the 
literature also establishes the need for shareholders to monitor one another. For example, controlling 
                                               
11
 See Bhagat and Black (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), and Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for 
surveys on corporate boards. 
12
 An alternative prediction is that greater ownership concentration leads to entrenchment, resulting in higher agency 
costs. 
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shareholders have the ability to exploit minority shareholders in closely-held corporations (e.g., 
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi 1997, 1998; Laeven and Levine 2008; Nagar, Petroni, and Wolfenson 
2011). Such exploitation can include higher compensation to controlling shareholders, 
misappropriation of assets, and dilution of minority shareholders’ interests through the issuance of 
stock or dividends (Gogineni et al. 2010). As the ownership stake of a second shareholder increases, 
so does her ability and willingness to effectively monitor the largest shareholder. The monitoring 
activities by the second largest shareholder would be similar to those used by the largest shareholder 
to monitor managers (see discussion above in Section 3.1.1).  
Pagano and Roell (1998) specify conditions under which large shareholders monitor each 
other, reducing expropriation and improving firm performance. Their theoretical model predicts that 
expropriation of minority shareholders is likely to be less severe when the ownership stake of non-
controlling shareholders is more concentrated, as such concentration makes it easier and more 
effective to monitor the controlling shareholder (see also Bloch and Hege 2001; Volpin 2002; 
Gogineni et al. 2010). This is the typical “horizontal agency cost” (e.g., Gogineni et al. 2010) 
argument (i.e., conflicts between majority and minority shareholders) and leads to the prediction 
that as ownership by the second largest shareholder increases, agency costs decrease. 
 
H2a: As ownership of the second largest owner increases, audit fees decrease. 
H2b: As ownership of the second largest owner increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.1.3 CEO Ownership 
A dominant belief in the literature is that as CEO ownership increases, her incentives align 
more with those of other shareholders, reducing the agency problem that arises from separation of 
ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Tirole 2006). This is known as the 
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alignment effect. In our sample, CEO ownership is high compared with prior studies (e.g., mean 
CEO ownership is 49% of the shares in our study). We predict that as CEO ownership increases, 
agency costs decline and therefore auditors supply less effort. Consistent with the belief that CEO 
ownership reduces agency costs, we also predict that firms with high CEO ownership are less likely 
to employ a Big 4 auditor. 
 
H3a: As CEO ownership increases, audit fees decrease. 
H3b: As CEO ownership increases, choice of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
3.2. Family Relationships 
3.2.1. CEO and Major Shareholder 
Major shareholders are often family members of the CEO for private firms. There are 
interesting competing hypotheses when the CEO is related to the major shareholder. Because of the 
family relationship, these shareholders no longer act as independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’ 
decisions. In addition, family-controlled firms are likely to suffer from greater horizontal agency 
costs. It may be easier for major shareholders, who are family members of the CEO, to extract 
private benefits from minority shareholders or other stakeholders (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2000). The reason it may be easier to extract 
these benefits is that major family owners typically have strong influence over choosing members 
of the board (Johannisson and Huse 2000). Consequently, the monitoring effectiveness of the board 
may be impaired when its composition is determined primarily by the CEO’s family. These 
arguments would support the idea that agency costs will increase when there is a family relation 
between the CEO and major shareholder. In this case, auditors are expected to supply more effort, 
and firms are expected to demand Big 4 auditors. 
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An alternative view is that family member CEOs are less likely to act in ways that 
opportunistically harm other family members. That is, installing a family member as the CEO could 
be a mechanism through which family-owned companies can increase their monitoring of 
management and reduce the need for external monitoring. If this effect dominates, the agency costs 
are smaller when the CEO is a family member because familial ties are likely to create closer 
alignment of the CEO’s preferences with those of family owners. 
The demand for a Big 4 in the presence of CEO-major shareholder family relationship also 
presents interesting counter-arguments. One the one hand, demand for a Big 4 auditor could 
increase to the extent that this family relationship increases agency costs. Agency costs would be 
higher for reasons discussed above (e.g., lack of independent monitoring by major shareholders and 
expropriation of minority shareholders). In this setting, CEOs potentially benefit by signaling their 
commitment to higher-quality reporting. 
On the other hand, demand for a Big 4 could decrease under at least two conditions. First, 
while hiring a Big 4 auditor has commitment value for the firm (and the CEO), the CEO in a 
family-relationship setting may wish to reduce audit cost by not hiring a Big 4 auditor. Major 
shareholders’ family relationship with the CEO may negate the need for costly independent 
verification by Big 4 auditors. The saved resources by using a less costly auditor increase firm 
value, which is in the best interest of both the CEO and major shareholders (who are in the same 
family). Second, the CEO also has incentives not to demand a higher-quality auditor when this 
means that her ability (or her family’s ability, including the major shareholder’s ability) to extract 
private benefits from the firm would be limited through such a hire. Presumably, Big 4 auditors 
would have a greater ability to limit these private benefits.  
Thus, for this CEO family-related agency setting, the demand for a Big 4 auditor reflects the 
trade-off between the benefits from signaling higher-quality reporting versus the costs of additional 
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audit fees and reduced consumption of private benefits. Because of competing arguments, we state 
our fourth hypothesis as two-sided: 
 
H4a: When a family relationship exists between the major shareholder and the CEO, audit 
fees are affected. 
H4b: When a family relationship exists between the major shareholder and the CEO, choice 
of Big 4 auditor is affected. 
 
3.2.2. Board Independence 
Boards are meant to protect shareholders’ assets and the interests of the company’s other 
stakeholders (e.g., creditors and employees). In this sense, boards are directed to monitor the 
activities of managers. An extensive literature exists which supports the notion that more 
independent boards more effectively monitor managers’ activities. Firms with more independent 
boards commit less financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996) and have less earnings management or 
provide fewer discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1996; Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000; Xie, 
Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; Jaggi, Leung, and Gul 2009).  
However, consistent with our two-sided predictions for H4a, as the proportion of board 
members from the CEO’s family increases, audit effort could either increase or decrease. With 
respect to the demand for a Big 4 auditor, the relation is also not obvious because the CEO faces 
conflicting incentives. The additional (potentially unnecessary) costs associated with hiring a Big 4 
auditor and the reduced ability of the CEO or her family board members to privately benefit from 
these family relationships reduce the expected demand for a Big 4 auditor in this higher agency cost 
setting. As a result, the demand for a Big 4 auditor may be confounded in the presence of family 
relationships between the CEO and board members. 
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We propose two hypotheses related to board independence. First, we predict that family 
relationships between major shareholders and the board imply that owners have insiders to monitor 
managers, which makes audited information less important. In other words, fewer agency conflicts 
reduce the need for auditing. This setting would result in the reduced supply of auditor effort and 
less demand for a Big 4 auditor. 
Second, if there are family ties between the CEO and board members, given that there are 
competing arguments as to whether the board will act more or less independently of the CEO, our 
hypothesis is two-sided. We summarize these hypotheses as: 
 
H5a: As the proportion of board members from the largest owning family increases, audit 
fees decrease. 
H5b: As the proportion of board members from the largest owning family increases, choice 
of Big 4 auditor decreases. 
 
H6a: As the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases, audit fees are 
affected. 
H6b: As the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases, choice of Big 4 
auditor is affected. 
 
4. Research Design 
For our auditor effort tests, we use model (1) to test our six hypotheses of the relation 
between agency costs and the supply of auditor effort after controlling for numerous firm and audit 
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characteristics that explain normal audit fees.13 Specifically, we regress the log of raw audit fees 
(LNFEE) on our six test variables as well as 24 client-firm characteristics, five audit-firm variables, 
and year and industry fixed effects (firm subscripts omitted).  
 
LNFEEt = α0 + α1OWNER_CONCt + α2OWNER_SECONDt + α3OWNER_CEOt + 
α4FAM_CEO/OWNERt + α5FAM_BOARD/OWNERt + α6FAM_BOARD/CEOt + 
α7LNSALESt + α8LNEMPLOYt + α9LEVt + α10CHLEVt + α11INVRECt + 
α12GROWTHt + α13ROAt + α14INCPICt + α15DECPICt + α16INTANGt + 
α17UNITEMSt + α18NOINDt + α19FOREIGNt + α20LNSUBt + α21FYEt + 
α22INVESTMENTSt + α23ACQUISITIONt + α24LOSSt + α25CURRATIOt + 
α26BIG4t + α27GAAPt + α28CHGAAPt + α29INDSPECt + α30CHAUDITORt  + 
α31LASTYRAUDITt+ α32MODOPINIONSt + α32CHCEOt    + α33CITYt + 
∑α34,cCOUNTYc + ∑α35,iINDi + ∑α36,yYRy + νt 
(1) 
 
The Appendix lists all variables employed and their definitions. α1 through α6 test 
hypotheses H1a through H6a, while the remaining variables serve as controls. We measure ownership 
concentration (OWNER_CONC) using the Herfindahl index and expect that as ownership 
concentration increases, agency costs decrease (α1 < 0). To test the second hypothesis, we use 
ultimate ownership of the second largest owner (OWNER_SECOND), and expect that as ownership 
increases, agency costs decrease (α2 < 0).14 For the third hypothesis, we use the fraction of shares 
                                               
13
 This approach is similar to first estimating abnormal audit fees as the residuals from a regression of total audit fees on 
the control variables and then using the residuals as the dependent variable in a regression on our test variables. No 
inferences are affected if we use that approach instead. 
14
 We provide a caveat that there is a possible negative mechanical relation between OWNER_SECOND and 
OWNER_CONC (see correlation in Table 2 below). When excluding either of these variables from the model, 
inferences remain the same for the demand model (discussed next). For the effort model, we find that OWNER_CONC 
becomes insignificant when OWNER_SECOND is dropped from the test. 
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owned by the CEO as our primary measure (OWNER_CEO) and predict a negative effect of CEO 
ownership on agency costs (α3 < 0). In Section 6.3.4, we test whether this relation is non-linear. 
For our fourth hypothesis, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is a member 
of the largest owning family (FAM_CEO/OWNER). We predict that family ownership has an effect 
on agency costs (α4 ≠ 0). We refrain from making a directional hypothesis due to the opposing 
forces that are at work. For the fifth hypothesis, we measure family influence of the largest 
shareholder on the board as the proportion of board members related to the largest shareholder 
(FAM_BOARD/OWNER). We expect a negative relation (α5 < 0). Finally, for our sixth hypothesis 
the test variable is the proportion of board members related to the CEO (FAM_BOARD/CEO). 
FAM_BOARD/CEO can thus be interpreted as a measure of the strength of family ties between the 
CEO and the board.15 As with our fourth hypotheses, we refrain from a directional hypothesis (i.e., 
α6 ≠ 0). 
Our choice of control variables is guided by prior research (e.g., DeFond, Raghunandan, and 
Subramanyam 2002; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; Choi, Kim, and Zang 2010; Hope and 
Langli 2010) and we additionally employ other variables relevant for our private firm setting. 
Therefore, model (1) examines whether our ownership characteristics and family relationships 
explain audit fees beyond an extensive set of factors previously identified in the literature. 
We include the natural log of sales (LNSALES), natural log of number of employees 
(LNEMPLOY), leverage (LEV) and change in leverage (CHLEV), proportion of inventory and 
receivables to total assets (INVREC), sales growth (GROWTH), return on assets (ROA), increases or 
decreases in paid-in capital (INCPIC and DECPIC), proportion of intangible assets to total assets 
(INTANG), the existence of special or unusual items (UNITEMS), the number of industries in which 
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 Note that FAM_BOARD/OWNER and FAM_BOARD/CEO measure the degree of family influence rather than just the 
existence of such influence. 
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the firm operates (NOIND), the existence of foreign operations (FOREIGN), natural logarithm of 
the number of subsidiaries (LNSUB), a fiscal year-end other than December 31 (FYE), long- and 
short-term investments in securities scaled by sales (INVESTMENTS), acquisitions during the year 
(ACQUISITIONS), negative earnings (LOSS), current ratio (CURRATIO), Big 4 audit firm (BIG4), 
use of regular GAAP (GAAP; as opposed to simplified GAAP for smaller enterprises), changed 
to/from regular GAAP from/to simplified GAAP during the year (CHGAAP), auditor industry 
specialization (INDSPEC), change of auditor during the year (CHAUDITOR), an indicator for the 
last year of the incumbent auditor (LASTYRAUDIT), audit report modifications (MODOPINIONS), 
change in CEO during the year (CHCEO), and whether the client resides in a municipality officially 
classified as a city or not (CITY). In addition, we include fixed effects for the county in which the 
client firm is located (COUNTY), two-digit industry (IND), and year (YR). 
To test our six hypotheses of the demand for a Big 4 auditor, we employ the following logit 
regression model with control variables (firm subscript omitted): 
 
BIG4t = β0 + β1OWNER_CONCt + β2OWNER_SECONDt + β3OWNER_CEOt + 
β4FAM_CEO/OWNERt + β5FAM_BOARD/OWNERt + β6FAM_BOARD/CEOt + 
β7LNTAt + β8LEVt + β9UNSECUREDt + β10LOSSt + β11FOREIGNt + 
β12EXANTEFINt + β13INCPICt + β14ROAt + β15CITYt + ∑β16,cCOUNTYc + 
∑β17,iINDi + ∑β18,yYRy + ηt 
(2) 
 
β1 through β6 test hypotheses H1b through H6b, while the remaining variables serve as 
controls. BIG4 is an indicator variable for whether the firm employs a Big 4 auditing firm or a 
forerunner. We expect that our agency variables relate to the demand for a Big 4 auditor in the same 
way that they relate to auditor effort. Specifically, our indicator variable for a Big 4 auditor is 
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expected to relate negatively to OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, OWNER_CEO, and 
FAM_BOARD/OWNER. For our two CEO family-related variables (FAM_CEO/OWNER and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO), we provide expectations consistent with those for auditor effort. That is, 
family relationships between the CEO and either the major shareholder (FAM_CEO/OWNER) or 
board members (FAM_BOARD/CEO) may decrease or increase the demand for Big 4 auditors. 
We base the control variables on prior research that has examined the choice of Big 4 
auditors (e.g., Khurana and Raman 2004; Knechel, Niemi, and Sundgren 2008). In particular, we 
control for firm size (LNTA), leverage (LEV), unsecured debt (UNSECURED), loss firms (LOSS), 
the percentage of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN), operating cash flow less net investments in 
tangible and intangible fixed assets scaled by current assets (EXANTEFIN), increase in paid-in 
capital (INCPIC), return on assets (ROA), and whether the client firm is located in a city or not 
(CITY). Finally, the logit regression models include county, industry, and year fixed effects. As an 
alternative specification, we additionally include controls for four alternative ownership 
characteristics (INSTITUTIONAL, STATE, INTERNATIONAL, and INDUSTRIAL). 
 
5. Data on Ownership and Family Relationships 
We obtain our data from two sources. First, firm-specific information, such as the firm’s 
financial information, auditor, CEO, board members, and owners, comes from Experian AS. 
Experian collects information from the Brønnøysund Register Center (BRC), which is an 
administrative agency responsible for a number of national control and registration schemes for 
business and industry. These data are publicly available. Second, information on family 
relationships comes from the National Register Office (NRO). In contrast to BRC data, NRO data 
are generally not publicly available. Specifically, the social security numbers of any person having 
roles as owners, CEOs, or board members are not available unless special permissions are obtained. 
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Family relationships among individuals are also not publicly available. We gained access to these 
data through a contract with the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at the 
Norwegian Business School. CCGR obtained permissions to gather and merge data from the two 
sources in accordance with confidentiality and secrecy rules set forth by the Norwegian Data 
Inspectorate, an independent administrative body that is set up to ensure that private and public 
storage of data are in accordance with the Norwegian Personal Data Act.  
In Norway, all limited liability firms, independent of size and listing status, must send 
audited financial statements to the Center for Annual Accounts (CAA), which is part of the BRC. 
According to the Accounting Act (paragraph 7-26), limited liability firms that do not qualify as 
“small enterprises” are required to disclose its 20 largest shareholders and their shareholdings in the 
notes as long as individual shareholdings exceed one percent. Firms that qualify as small enterprises 
must disclose names and shareholdings of the ten largest shareholders as long as the shareholder 
owns five percent or more. In addition, the Accounting Act requires disclosure of names and 
shareholdings of all CEOs and members of the Board and the Corporate Assembly. Experian 
collects ownership information from the notes and to the extent possible looks up the social security 
number of each owner. The names of CEOs and board members are collected from the Central 
Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (CCRLE), which is also a part BRC. Data that identify 
CEOs and board members (from CCRLE) are merged with data on ownership (from CAA) using 
the social security number for each individual that occurs in the two databases.16  
The notes to the accounts specify direct ownership for each firm. Utilizing the fact that 
direct ownership is available for all limited liability firms, data on ultimate ownership for each firm 
has been calculated by tracing ownership structures. Information on families’ ultimate ownership 
                                               
16
 For any pair of individuals, our data source has classified the pair in terms of a basic family relationship type. These 
types are parent, grandparent, great grandparent, great-great grandparent, and marriage. Using these basic types, we 
have generated 18 types of family relationships between two individuals, including relationships like brother, sister, 
cousin, uncle/aunt, and nephew/niece. 
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and family influence on the CEO and boards has been constructed by checking for relationships by 
blood and/or marriage for any pair of persons that occurs for owners, board members, CEOs, and 
Chairman using data from NRO. Family relationships may cover up to four generations. We 
assigned persons to the same family if they (as of year-end 2007) are related through their parents, 
grandparents, or by marriage. A single person without relatives constitutes a family of size one. 
 
6. Sample and Results  
6.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample selection procedure is explained in Table 1. Our sample period spans 2000 
through 2007. We include only firms that are not publicly traded on a stock exchange. We exclude 
firms with sales or total assets less than NOK 800,000 and firms with missing information 
concerning audit fees or with fees below NOK 3,000. We further eliminate financial firms, firms 
with missing information, subsidiaries, and firm controlled by unknown owners or the State.17 
Because the data provider did not provide a split between audit and non-audit fees for years 2003 
through 2005, our sample covers the five-year period from 2000-2002 and 2006-2007. We have a 
final sample of 185,109 firm-year observations. Our tests are based on pooled samples, and we use 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.18 
Panel A of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. As can be expected for a sample of private 
firms, firms are small on average (mean SALES of NOK 16 million) but with a large standard 
deviation. Audit fees (FEE) have a mean of NOK 21,452, and 18.1 percent of firms employ Big 4 
auditors. As expected, ownership concentration (OWNER_CONC) is quite high for private firms, 
with a mean Herfindahl index of 0.605. CEO ownership (OWNER_CEO) is also quite high (mean of 
                                               
17
 To mitigate the potential influence of outliers in such a large sample, we remove observations with (absolute) 
studentized residuals exceeding two. No inferences are affected by this choice. Similarly, no conclusions change if we 
instead winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
18
 Results are consistent when employing the Fama-MacBeth approach. 
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49.2 percent). On average, the CEO comes from the largest family (FAM_CEO/OWNER) in 70.6 
percent of the cases, 71.2 percent of board members come from the largest family 
(FAM_BOARD/OWNER), and 15.1 percent of the board members are family members of the CEO 
(FAM_BOARD/CEO). Panel B presents Spearman correlation coefficients among the dependent 
variables, test variables, and primary control variables.19 As expected, most of the variables are 
significantly correlated. However, unreported variance inflation factors and condition indices give 
no indication that multicollinearity is a serious issue in our multivariate analyses.20 Important for 
our tests, and consistent with our unique data on ownership and family relationships, we are 
interested in testing the incremental effect of one agency characteristic while holding the others 
constant. 
 
6.2 Tests of Hypotheses  
6.2.1 Auditor Effort Tests 
We report the results of tests of whether auditors’ fees (i.e., auditors’ effort) vary with 
agency conflicts in private firms in Table 3. Column 1 reports our primary specification with all test 
variables included simultaneously and measured as continuous variables (except 
FAM_CEO/OWNER which is an indicator variable). The regression has an adjusted R2 of 52.8% 
and we note that most of the control variables are significant in the predicted direction. For 
example, audit fees are higher for firms that are larger, have more financial leverage, have unusual 
items, are more diversified (in terms of industries and subsidiaries), have greater foreign operations, 
                                               
19
 Note that correlation coefficients are provided for descriptive purposes only and do not constitute tests of our 
hypotheses. Specifically, we are testing our agency cost proxies against a proxy for abnormal audit fees; hence it is 
essential to control for the normal factors that explain fees (i.e., risk and effort variables). It is also important to control 
for other agency-related variables, as we do in our multiple regression tests. 
20
 Specifically, no variance inflation factors are above 3.04 in any of the specifications tabulated in Table 3 and Table 4.  
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engage in acquisitions, and employ a Big 4 auditor.21  
The estimated coefficient on OWNER_CONC is negative and significant, consistent with our 
prediction in H1a that greater ownership concentration leads to easier monitoring of managers, 
translating into less effort by external auditors. Next, the coefficient on OWNER_SECOND is 
negative and significant, a finding which is in line with H2a and recent research in finance 
suggesting that a strong second shareholder can mitigate potential exploitation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholder. We further find a negative and significant coefficient 
on OWNER_CEO, consistent with H3a that CEO ownership aligns managers’ interests with those of 
the firms’ other stakeholders. 
The next three variables, FAM_CEO/OWNER, FAM_BOARD/OWNER, and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO, measure differences in monitoring and independence. Whereas 
FAM_CEO/OWNER captures the family relationship between the CEO and major shareholders, the 
other two measure the degree of board independence based on family relationships. We find a 
positive and significant coefficient for FAM_CEO/OWNER. In other words, we document that when 
the CEO is also a member of the largest family, auditors increase their effort. Thus, our empirical 
findings support the idea that, because of the family relationship, these shareholders no longer act as 
independent monitors in disciplining CEOs’ decisions, thus increasing agency costs. 
We further find empirical support for H5a. Auditor effort is decreasing in the proportion of 
board members related to the largest family owner (FAM_BOARD/OWNER), consistent with fewer 
agency conflicts between family owners and the board. Finally, the empirical results indicate that 
audit effort is increasing in the proportion of board members related to the CEO 
                                               
21
 The estimated coefficient on INDSPEC is negative. The Pearson correlation between audit fees and INDSPEC is 
significantly positive (0.109) and the negative regression coefficient is likely caused by correlation with the firm size 
controls and BIG4 (i.e., INDSPEC is positive and significant when the model is estimated on a subset of firms with non-
Big 4 auditors). In addition, CHLEV has the opposite sign of expectations. No inferences are affected if we exclude that 
(or any other) control variable from the test. 
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(FAM_BOARD/CEO). This finding is consistent with the loss of board independence when family 
relationships exist between the CEO and board members. Thus, to control for the increase in agency 
conflicts, auditors exert more effort.22 
In the second column of Table 3 we report results of regressions in which we replace 
continuous test variables with indicator variables equal to one when equal to or above the mean, 
zero otherwise. Results are similar for five the six tests. For FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4a), the 
coefficients changes from significantly positive to only marginally significant (t = 1.56). 
In the next six columns, we provide results with one test variable included at a time. We 
note two differences from the full model results: OWNER_SECOND is no longer significant and 
FAM_CEO/OWNER is now significantly negative (as opposed to significantly positive). These 
differences highlight the importance of testing for multiple agency settings simultaneously. As we 
discussed previously, prior studies have been limited to looking at one or a few agency variables 
because of data limitations. We are able to provide detailed tests of six agency settings. Thus, we 
base our primary conclusions on the full model, which we believe better controls for multiple 
agency settings. 
 
                                               
22
 To assess the economic significance of our results, we conduct two tests. First, we consider the effect of a change 
from the first to the third quartile of the distribution of our test variables (holding other variables constant). The effect 
for each translates into approximately NOK 1,000 or NOK 6,000 in total. While this does not appear to be a large 
amount, note again that the sample firms in our study are very small compared with those examined in prior research. 
For example, using data from Statistics Norway, the aggregate effect is equivalent to 18.8 man-hours based on average 
salaries for full-time employed “senior officials and managers in professional, scientific, and technical activities,” which 
includes auditors. Compared with all full-time employed persons in Norway (in the professional, scientific, and 
technical activities), the aggregate effect is equivalent to 34.9 (27.3) man-hours. In addition, we also compare these 
effects directly with the average audit fees in our sample. The average effect for our test variables is 4.7% and in 
aggregate the effect is 28.5% of average fees. Second, we compare the effects of the test variables with those of the 
control variables. In order to conduct such a comparison, we first standardize the estimated coefficients so that they are 
all directly comparable. Consistent with many prior studies, firm size is clearly the most important determinant of fees 
as well as the demand for a Big 4 auditor. However, for the fee regressions, in untabulated analyses we observe that 
OWNER_SECOND has an equal or greater effect than 12 of the other control variables. The other test variables also fare 
quite well in such a comparison. Overall we conclude that, although firm size is economically more significant than our 
test variables, the test variables have a non-trivial effect on both audit effort and audit demand. 
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6.2.2 Demand for High-Quality Auditor Tests 
In Table 4 we report results of the analyses that measure the demand for higher-quality 
auditing by firms/owners to reduce agency conflicts. As predicted in H1b, H2b, and H5b, we observe 
negative and significant coefficients on the three variables that capture non-CEO-related agency 
conflicts: OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, and FAM_BOARD/OWNER. These results are 
consistent with those obtained when testing audit fees (or auditor effort). In contrast, the coefficient 
for OWNER_CEO is negative, as predicted in H3b, but not significant.  
For our two CEO family-related variables, FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4b) and 
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6b), we find no significant evidence that the demand for a Big 4 auditor is 
affected when a family relationship exists between the CEO and major shareholder or as the number 
of board members related to the CEO increases. One interpretation of these insignificant 
coefficients is that, while hiring a higher-quality auditor may bring value to the firm as a whole (in 
part by reducing agency conflicts), CEOs in these family-relationship settings may perceive that the 
additional costs of hiring a Big 4 auditor is not necessary. Major shareholders and board members 
could believe that independent verification of a CEO family member is not warranted, allowing firm 
value to increase through reduced audit fees. In addition, the CEO may have personal incentives not 
to demand a Big 4 auditor to the extent that these external monitors make it more difficult for the 
CEO (or the CEO’s family) to extract resources from the firm. Thus, we attribute the weaker 
relation between BIG4 and our CEO family-related agency variables to the trade-off that exists 
when deciding the net benefits to hiring a Big 4 auditor. These trade-offs are less apparent when 
CEO family-related agency settings are not considered. We conclude that firms demand greater 
audit quality in the presence of agency conflicts (that are not CEO family-related).23,24 
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 Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree (2009) model the “match” (or “misalignment”) between the audit firm and its client 
and use this binary variable in their empirical tests. Our regressions include proxies for all the variables included in their 
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We then provide results using indicator variables for the test variables (measured as above) 
in Column 2. Results are similar to those using continuous measures, except that OWNER_CEO 
changes from insignificantly negative (t = −1.26) to significantly negative (t = −3.45), consistent 
with H3b. The remaining columns tabulate results with test variables included one at a time. 
Whereas FAM_CEO/OWNER and FAM_BOARD/CEO were insignificant in the full model, they are 
now significantly negative. These differences from the full model again highlight an advantage of 
controlling for multiple agency variables to provide more complete inferences. 
 
6.3 Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Tests (Untabulated) 
6.3.1. Additional Controls for Firm Size 
In our tabulated analyses, we include two explicit controls for client firm size (LNSALES and 
LNEMPLOY). We also include additional variables that relate to size, including BIG4, FOREIGN, 
LNSUB, ACQUISITIONS, and CITY. However, given the potential importance of firm size as a 
control variable, we conduct a number of additional tests. First, we replace LNEMPLOY (or 
LNSALES) with log of total assets in the audit fee model. Second, to test for non-linear size effects, 
we add square root terms of both LNSALES and LNEMPLOY to the model. Third, we add the square 
of both the size variables. Fourth, we include interaction terms between the size controls and all 
variables included in the model. Fifth, as a related test, we either break our size controls into 
quintiles and introduce them separately as controls, or we include these as both main and interacting 
                                                                                                                                                            
model (i.e., LNSALES; LNEMPLOY; ACQUISITIONS; CHLEV; INCPIC; DECPIC; GROWTH). No inferences are 
affected if we replace the individual control variables with a binary variable computed following Landsman et al.’s 
approach. 
24
 The change in the probability of a firm choosing a Big 4 auditor increases by 55.5 % (i.e., from 0.076 to 0.13) when 
all six test variables change from the third to first quartile (holding all other variables constant at their mean values). 
The percentage changes in the probability of a firm choosing a Big 4 auditor vary between 2.4 % and 24.5 % for the six 
variables. We further observe that, using standardized coefficients, OWNER_SECOND has a greater effect than all non-
size control variables. Again, the other test variables continue do compare well. 
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effects in the model. Finally, we exclude the smallest 10% of firms (based on sales). In all these 
tests, results are consistent with those tabulated. 
 
6.3.2. Big 6 instead of Big 4 
As the Big 4 audit firms have a relatively small market share among private firms (18.1 
percent in our sample), as an additional test we replace Big 4 with Big 6. Specifically, in addition to 
the international Big 4 firms we also include two other large audit firms: BDO Noraudit and Inter 
Revisjon. Combined, the Big 6 firms have a market share of 29.9 percent. In fact, BDO Noraudit 
and Inter Revisjon are the two largest audit firms in terms of number of private client firms in 
Norway, with Ernst & Young and PWC close behind. 
We first repeat the auditor effort tests of Table 3 by replacing BIG4 with BIG6 in the audit 
fee model. No inferences are affected.25 More importantly, we redo the auditor demand test in Table 
4 using Big 6 as the dependent variable. Again, results are quite similar.26 
 
6.3.4. Non-linearity of CEO Ownership 
To explore the possibility that the effect of CEO ownership is non-linear, we add the square 
root of CEO ownership to the models. We first note that adding this variable does not affect the 
inferences for the other variables and further observe that the square root variable is negative and 
marginally statistically significant for the effort regression. Thus, there is some support of a non-
linear relation for CEO ownership.  
                                               
25
 As an alternative to controlling for Big 4 in the audit fee model, we run the auditor effort tests separately for Big 4 
and non-Big 4 client firms. Although this is not one of our hypotheses, it is interesting to note that four of the six 
estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude for the Big 4 than for the non-Big 4 subsample. This observation is 
consistent with Big 4 firms being more sophisticated than other audit firms and thus responding more strongly to 
variations in agency conflicts. 
26
 Specifically, in this specification OWNER_CONC, OWNER_SECOND, and FAM_BOARD/OWNER remain 
significant in the hypothesized direction, while OWNER_CEO is now significantly negative (as predicted in H3b) and 
FAM_CEO/OWNER also becomes significantly negative (as discussed in H4b). 
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6.3.5. Controls for CEO Compensation 
Executives can extract rents from the company by also receiving excessive compensation. 
We test if our results are robust to controlling for CEO compensation by including either raw CEO 
compensation or CEO compensation scaled by firm size. No inferences are affected in these tests.  
 
6.3.6. Time Period Effects 
In the aftermath of well-known international accounting scandals and the introduction of 
SOX in the U.S., changes were made to Norwegian accounting and auditing regulations that were 
aimed at increasing accounting and audit quality. The changes took effect between the two periods 
covered in our sample. Even though we control for time-period effects through year fixed effects, 
we separately examine the time periods 2000-2002 and 2006-2007 in order to assess if the relations 
have changed. We find almost identical results across the two periods. The only difference is that 
OWNER_CONC is not significant in the earlier time period for the audit fee test (H1a). Overall, our 
robustness tests corroborate the main findings tabulated in the paper. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This study provides empirical evidence of agency conflicts associated with ownership 
characteristics and family relationships for private firms in the Norwegian market. Using a detailed 
data set obtained by special permission from the government, we are able to measure ultimate 
ownership concentration, ultimate ownership of the second largest shareholder and of the CEO, and 
family relationships among owners, board members, and CEOs for all Norwegian private limited 
liability firms. These data allow us to simultaneously test multiple sources of agency conflicts. 
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We first test for the extent of agency conflicts using audit fees. Controlling for a large 
number of client-firm and audit-firm characteristics, we predict and find that ownership 
characteristics and family relationships explain audit fees. Specifically, we find that audit fees 
decrease (i.e., audit effort decreases) as ownership concentration increases and as the proportion of 
shares held by the second largest shareholder increases. The first result is consistent with greater 
ownership concentration alleviating agency costs between shareholders and the managers (i.e., 
vertical agency costs). Larger shareholders can more efficiently monitor managers. The second 
result is consistent with reduced agency costs between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (i.e., horizontal agency costs). A second large shareholder serves as a monitor of a 
controlling shareholder who potentially has the ability to extract private benefits from minority 
shareholders. 
Related to the CEO, we find that as CEO ownership increases, audit fees decrease. This is 
consistent with increased ownership aligning the incentives of the CEO with those of the firms’ 
other stakeholders. In contrast, holding CEO ownership constant, we find that when the CEO is a 
member of the largest owning family, audit fees increase (i.e., auditor effort increases). This finding 
suggests that shareholders are less likely to act as independent monitors of the CEO when a family 
relationship exists, increasing the probability of misappropriation by the CEO or extraction of 
private benefits by controlling owners. 
For board independence, we find that audit fees decrease as the proportion of board 
members from the largest owning family increases. This finding reflects the likelihood that those 
inside the firm (board members) are more likely to act as effective monitors on behalf of those 
outside the firm (controlling owners) when a family relation exists. We also find that boards seem to 
lose their independence as the proportion of board members from the CEO’s family increases. This 
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result follows from the natural expectation that family relationships with the CEO impair the 
oversight responsibility of the board. 
As our second test, we consider each of our agency settings and the firm’s demand for a Big 
4 auditor. Consistent with results found for the auditor effort tests, the demand for a Big 4 auditor 
decreases with ownership concentration, level of ownership by the second largest owner, and family 
relationships between the board and the largest owner. We find no relation between demand for a 
Big 4 auditor and CEO ownership for our main tests but we do in sensitivity tests. Finally, for our 
two CEO family-related agency cost settings, we observe no impact on the demand for a Big 4 
auditor when the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members 
related to the CEO increases. These insignificant relations likely reflect a trade-off between the 
benefits of more credible reporting from using a Big 4 auditor versus the potential costs of increased 
fees associated with a Big 4 auditor and the reduced ability of the CEO (or the CEO’s family) to 
extract resources from the firm. 
Our research makes a contribution by providing a detailed investigation of the agency 
settings for private firms. Several differences exist between private and public firms, and results for 
one group are not necessarily expected to be the same as those for the other. In addition, in 
aggregate private firms provide the majority of economic activity throughout the world. We obtain a 
unique database for private firms in Norway to provide tests of the impact of ownership 
characteristics and family relationships on agency conflicts. This database entails combining 
ownership characteristics and family relationships using social security numbers, available only 
through special permission from the government. 
There is ample opportunity for future research to further explore the issues we examine in 
this study. Perhaps the most obvious suggestion would be to test for economic consequences of 
variations in the agency conflicts and/or audit variables that we consider. Another possibility is to 
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make further use of the register data available through linking databases using social security 
numbers. For example, auditor independence issues could be examined by considering auditors’ 
personal income and wealth. Other research could make use of interesting aspects of alternative 
institutional environments, or use research methods other than archival data to explore agency 
conflicts in private firms. 
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Appendix: Definitions of Variables  
Test variables  
OWNER_CONC  = Herfindahl ownership concentration ratio in year t based on ultimate 
ownership. 
OWNER_SECOND  = Fraction of shares held by the second largest owner in year t using 
ultimate ownership.  
OWNER_CEO = Fraction of shares held by the CEO in year t, based on ultimate 
ownership.  
FAM_CEO/OWNER = 1 if the CEO is related to the largest ultimate family owners through 
blood or marriage.  
FAM_BOARD/OWNER = Family influence on the board in year t computed as the number of 
board members from the largest owning family divided by the total 
number of board members. 
FAM_BOARD/CEO = Family relationships between the CEO and board members, defined 
as the number of family members of the CEO on the board divided 
by the total number of board members.  
 
Other variables  
ACQUISITIONS = 1 if the firm has increased long-term investments in other companies 
from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise. 
AGE = Firm’s age in year t measured as number of years since incorporation.  
BIG4 = 1 if the auditing firm is one of the Big 4 auditing firms or their 
forerunners in year t, 0 otherwise.  
CHAUDITOR = 1 if the firm changed auditor in year t, 0 otherwise 
CHCEO = 1 if the firm appointed a new CEO in year t, 0 otherwise 
CHGAAP = 1 if the firm has changed from simplified GAAP to regular GAAP or 
from regular GAAP to simplified GAAP during year t.  
CHLEV = Change in interest bearing debt from t−1 to t = LEVt − LEVt-1. 
CITY = 1 if firm is located in a city, 0 otherwise.  
COUNTYc = 1 if firm is located in county c, 0 otherwise (c = 0, 1, ..19).  
CURRATIO = Current ratio at the end of year t. 
DECPIC = 1 if the firm decreased share capital from t−1 to t, 0 otherwise.  
EMPLOY = Number of employees in year t is estimated as sum wages in year t 
divided by the average salary for full time male and female workers in 
year t if sum wages > 0, 0 otherwise. Data on average salary is taken 
from Statistics Norway. 
EXANTEFIN = Operating cash flow less net investments in tangible and intangible 
fixed assets scaled by current assets in year t. As in Knechel et al. 
(2008) we use a square root transformation of the ratio multiplied by −1 
if the unadjusted ratio was negative. Operating cash flow is estimated 
as operating income + depreciation + impairment − change in accounts 
receivables − change in inventory + change in accounts payable − 
change in taxes payable. Net investments in intangible and tangible 
fixed assets is estimated as change in intangible and fixed assets during 
the year plus depreciation and impairment since cash flow statements 
are not available.  
FEE = Audit fee in NOK 1,000, computed as the total fee paid to the auditor 
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for auditing services in year t. 
FOREIGN = Percentage of foreign subsidiaries in year t = the number of foreign 
subsidiaries in year t * 100 / total number of subsidiaries in year t. 
FYE = 1 for fiscal years ending other than December 31 in year t, 0 otherwise. 
GAAP = 1 if firm uses regular GAAP in year t and 0 otherwise.  
GROWTH = Change in sales in year t = (SALESt - SALESt−1) / SALESt−1. 
INCPIC = 1 if the firm increased share capital from t−1 to t, 0 otherwise. 
INDi = 1 if firm belongs to industry i, 0 otherwise. Two-digit industry codes 
are used to classify firms into industries. Firms in industries with 30 or 
less observations in a given year are reclassified to industry 99.  
INDUSTRIAL = 1 if industrial investors own 20% or more of the firm based on ultimate 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
INSTITUTIONAL = 1 if institutional investors own 20 % or more of the firm based on 
ultimate ownership, 0 otherwise 
INTANG = Intangible assets at the end of year t scaled by SALESt.  
INTERNATIONAL = 1 if international investors own 20 % or more of the firm based on 
ultimate ownership, 0 otherwise 
INVESTMENTS = (Long and short term investments in securities + bank deposits + cash)t 
scaled by SALESt.  
INVREC = Inventory and accounts receivable at the end of year t scaled by SALESt.  
LASTYRAUDIT = 1 in year t if the firm changed auditor in year t+1, 0 otherwise. 
LEV = Long- and short-term interest bearing debt / total assets, both at the end 
of year t. Short-term interest bearing debt = total short term debt − 
accounts payable − dividends − taxes payable − VAT and social service 
taxes − other short term debt.  
LNEMPLOY = Natural logarithm of 1+ number of employees = ln(1 + EMPLOYt). 
LNFEE = Natural logarithm of total fees paid to the auditor for auditing services 
in year t = ln(FEEt). 
LNSALES = Natural logarithm of total revenue from operations = ln(SALESt). 
LNSUB = Natural logarithm of 1 + number of subsidiaries in year t. 
LNTA =  Natural logarithm of total assets = ln(TAt) 
LOSS = 1 if net income after taxes before extraordinary item and taxes on 
extraordinary item < 0 in year t−1, 0 otherwise.  
MODOPINONS = The number of deviations from a clean audit report. The contents of the 
audit report are categorized into different deviations from the audit 
report, and up to 4 deviations are registered for each firm (i.e., the 
variable goes from 0 to 4).  
NOIND = Number of two digit industry codes the firm is registered with in year t. 
ROA = Return on assets = Earnings before interest, taxes, and extraordinary 
items in year t scaled by (TAt-1 + TAt) * 0.5  
SALES = Total revenue from operating activities in year t in NOK 1,000.  
STATE = 1 if the state owns 20 % or more of the firm based on ultimate 
ownership, 0 otherwise 
UNITEMS = 1 for firms with impairments or extraordinary items in year t, 0 
otherwise.  
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UNSECURED = Unsecured debt measured as property, plant and equipment less total 
debt scaled by total assets, measured at end of year t.  
YRy = 1 if observations belong to year y, 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Private and public limited liability companies 136,140 138,745 141,146 141,991 144,426 157,710 180,709 192,011 1,232,878 
Exclusion criteria:          
Public limited liability companies 582 571 529 492 463 459 471 384 3,951 
Operating revenue less than 800,000 NOK 55,180 56,092 57,081 56,142 55,151 64,325 81,038 87,257 512,266 
Total assets less than 800,000 NOK 14,218 13,747 13,836 14,286 14,427 14,598 13,933 13,652 112,697 
Missing information on audit fees, audit fees less than 3,000 NOK,
or unknown auditor 2,465 2,239 2,034 71,071 74,385 78,328 13,904 2,831 247,257 
Missing information (e.g. industry affiliation, founding date, prior 
year financial statement) or firm using IFRS 6,419 7,400 6,862 0 0 0 9,252 11,690 41,623 
Subsidiaries 11,088 12,131 12,199 0 0 0 16,274 25,242 76,934 
Information on family ownership not available 7,439 6,134 7,058 0 0 0 8,421 8,635 37,687 
Aggregate ownership less than 50% 238 381 420 0 0 0 266 383 1,688 
Controlled by unspecified owners or by the State 1,298 724 678 0 0 0 781 693 4,174 
Observations with absolute value of studentized residuals greater 
than two 1,898 2,008 2,079 0 0 0 1,694 1,814 9,493 
Sample size  35,315 37,318 38,370 0 0 0 34,675 39,431 185,109 
 
Note that the data provider does not provide a breakdown of audit remuneration into audit fees and non-audit fees for the years 2003, 2004, and 
2005. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distribution of variables (N = 185,109) 
  Mean St.dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Corporate governance        
OWNER_CONC 0.605 0.296 0.194 0.355 0.500 1 1 
OWNER_SECOND 0.219 0.184 0 0 0.226 0.35 0.5 
OWNER_CEO 0.492 0.370 0 0.143 0.5 0.923 1 
FAM_CEO/OWNER 0.706 0.455 0 0 1 1 1 
FAM_BOARD/OWNER 0.712 0.341 0 0.4 1 1 1 
FAM_BOARD/CEO 0.151 0.268 0 0 0 0.333 0.667 
INSTITUTIONS 0.012 0.108 0 0 0 0 0 
STATE 0.003 0.053 0 0 0 0 0 
INTERNATIONAL 0.010 0.101 0 0 0 0 0 
INDUSTRIAL 0.011 0.106 0 0 0 0 0 
Financial variables        
ACQUISITIONS 0.047 0.213 0 0 0 0 0 
CHLEV −0.007 0.143 −0.221 −0.055 0 0.019 0.242 
CURRATIO 1.679 1.727 0.401 0.968 1.246 1.772 4.067 
DECPIC 0.012 0.111 0 0 0 0 0 
EXANTEFIN 0.237 0.686 −0.871 −0.241 0.357 0.591 1.222 
FEE 21.452 17.930 7 12 17 25 49 
GROWTH 0.279 1.080 −0.307 −0.038 0.069 0.236 1.150 
INCPIC 0.066 0.248 0 0 0 0 1 
INTANG 0.020 0.066 0 0 0 0.006 0.109 
INVESTMENTS 0.326 0.784 0.006 0.036 0.111 0.272 1.215 
INVREC 0.181 0.170 0 0.061 0.147 0.249 0.487 
LEV 0.267 0.286 0 0 0.180 0.457 0.832 
LNFEE 2.868 0.602 1.946 2.485 2.833 3.219 3.892 
LOSS 0.214 0.410 0 0 0 0 1 
ROA 0.160 0.212 −0.131 0.042 0.124 0.256 0.561 
SALES 16,242.9 182,098.9 1,096.0 2,523.0 5,020.0 11,186.0 43,862.0 
TA 13,860.4 133,659.0 935.0 1,621.0 3,139.0 7,185.0 32,575.0 
UNITEMS 0.036 0.186 0 0 0 0 0 
UNSECURED −0.272 0.286 −0.884 −0.452 −0.153 −0.037 0.000 
Other variables        
AGE 12.814 12.100 2 5 10 16 33 
EMPLOY 9.434 61.611 0 1.605 3.669 7.648 26.717 
BIG4 0.181 0.385 0 0 0 0 1 
CHAUDITOR 0.083 0.276 0 0 0 0 1 
CHCEO 0.051 0.219 0 0 0 0 1 
CHGAAP 0.006 0.077 0 0 0 0 0 
CITY 0.558 0.497 0 0 1 1 1 
FOREIGN 0.015 0.120 0 0 0 0 0 
FYE 0.001 0.028 0 0 0 0 0 
GAAP 0.036 0.187 0 0 0 0 0 
INDSPEC 0.027 0.064 0 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.175 
LASTYRAUDIT 0.084 0.277 0 0 0 0 1 
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MODOPINONS 0.287 0669 0 0 0 0 2 
NOIND 1.514 0.843 1 1 1 2 3 
SUB 0.267 1.507 0 0 0 0 1 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Spearman correlation coefficients (N = 185,109) 
 Variables: LNFEE 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   13   
1 BIG4 0.092 * 
2 OWNER_CONC -0.121 * -0.050 * 
3 OWNER_SECOND 0.015 * -0.030 * -0.572 * 
4 OWNER_CEO -0.084 * -0.052 * 0.589 * -0.369 * 
5 FAM_CEO/OWNER -0.044 * -0.042 * 0.286 * -0.135 * 0.663 * 
6 FAM_BOARD/OWNER -0.171 * -0.062 * 0.493 * -0.227 * 0.376 * 0.416 * 
7 FAM_BOARD/CEO 0.029 * 0.002 -0.107 * 0.138 * -0.031 * 0.342 * 0.273 * 
8 GROWTH -0.053 * -0.006 * -0.023 * 0.012 * -0.015 * -0.022 * -0.039 * -0.038 * 
9 LEV -0.001 0.015 * -0.012 * -0.002 -0.042 * -0.012 * -0.001 -0.040 * -0.015 * 
10 LOSS 0.013 * 0.010 * -0.011 * -0.016 * -0.022 * -0.021 * -0.041 * -0.065 * 0.037 * 0.251 * 
11 ROA -0.101 * -0.032 * 0.044 * 0.026 * 0.054 * 0.029 * 0.065 * 0.305 * -0.107 * -0.397 * -0.273 * 
12 SALES 0.609 * 0.082 * -0.130 * 0.035 * -0.068 * -0.038 * -0.189 * -0.129 * 0.171 * -0.087 * -0.063 * 0.017 * 
13 UNSECURED 0.062 * -0.011 * 0.009 * 0.010 * 0.043 * 0.004 -0.045 * -0.104 * 0.317 * -0.524 * -0.062 * 0.190 * 0.130 * 
14 EMPLOY 0.549 * 0.051 * -0.149 * 0.051 * -0.056 * -0.030 * -0.220 * -0.173 * 0.184 * -0.122 * -0.050 * -0.028 * 0.772 * 0.082 * 
 
The table reports Spearman correlation coefficients between dependent variables and tests and main control variables. The sample is described in 
Table 1 and variables are defined in the Appendix. * denotes significant correlation coefficient at p<0.01.  
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TABLE 3 
OLS Regression of Audit Fees on Test Variables and Control Variables 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OWNER_CONC (H1a) − −0.032*** −0.024*** −0.039***      
  (−4.16) (−5.22) (−8.37)      
OWNER_SECOND (H2a) − −0.070*** −0.032***  0.004     
  (−7.15) (−7.56)  (0.63)     
OWNER_CEO (H3a) − −0.030*** −0.023***   −0.034***    
  (−5.20) (−6.82)   (−9.01)    
FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4a) +/– 0.012*** 0.007*    −0.009***   
  (3.11) (1.79)    (−3.16)   
FAM_BOARD/OWNER (H5a) − −0.038*** −0.021***     −0.039***  
  (−7.83) (−6.83)     (−9.52)  
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6a) +/– 0.028*** 0.017***      0.020*** 
  (4.91) (5.24)      (3.98) 
          
LNSALES + 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.237*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.237*** 
  (97.16) (97.36) (97.93) (98.34) (97.86) (98.14) (97.70) (98.38) 
LNEMPLOY + 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 
  (53.56) (53.70) (54.12) (54.59) (54.47) (54.59) (53.81) (54.58) 
LEV + 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
  (13.67) (13.60) (13.63) (13.62) (13.56) (13.62) (13.62) (13.57) 
CHLEV + −0.064*** −0.064*** −0.066*** −0.066*** −0.065*** −0.066*** −0.065*** −0.066*** 
  (−8.66) (−8.66) (−8.88) (−8.90) (−8.83) (−8.90) (−8.81) (−8.87) 
INVREC + 0.261*** 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.265*** 
  (32.36) (32.44) (32.61) (32.82) (32.74) (32.81) (32.44) (32.84) 
GROWTH + −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** −0.049*** 
  (−43.35) (−43.34) (−43.22) (−43.27) (−43.34) (−43.31) (−43.39) (−43.22) 
ROA − −0.153*** −0.154*** −0.160*** −0.162*** −0.159*** −0.161*** −0.157*** −0.161*** 
  (−23.62) (−23.85) (−24.75) (−25.10) (−24.67) (−24.96) (−24.37) (−25.06) 
INCPIC + 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 
  (16.01) (16.21) (16.69) (17.20) (16.83) (17.09) (16.53) (17.26) 
DECPIC + 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 
  (10.67) (10.73) (11.14) (11.35) (11.18) (11.30) (10.95) (11.37) 
INTANG + 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.109*** 0.114*** 
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  (4.89) (4.97) (5.18) (5.35) (5.24) (5.32) (5.14) (5.37) 
UNITEMS + 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
  (12.22) (12.25) (12.22) (12.21) (12.24) (12.23) (12.23) (12.22) 
NOIND + 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
  (18.76) (18.66) (18.90) (18.75) (18.82) (18.80) (18.96) (18.65) 
FOREIGN + 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.115*** 
  (8.43) (8.51) (8.57) (8.66) (8.62) (8.63) (8.48) (8.70) 
LNSUB + 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
  (9.20) (9.10) (9.18) (8.99) (8.99) (8.99) (9.20) (8.96) 
FYE + 0.117** 0.117** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.120** 0.128*** 0.118** 0.130*** 
  (2.43) (2.45) (2.66) (2.66) (2.51) (2.66) (2.47) (2.69) 
INVESTMENTS + 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
  (31.22) (31.17) (31.63) (31.45) (31.28) (31.45) (31.74) (31.31) 
ACQUISITIONS + 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
  (11.36) (11.43) (11.53) (11.57) (11.57) (11.57) (11.42) (11.58) 
LOSS + 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 
  (16.30) (16.42) (16.86) (17.05) (16.85) (16.97) (16.52) (17.11) 
CURRATIO + 0.001* 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (1.86) (1.92) (2.16) (2.31) (2.16) (2.28) (2.23) (2.25) 
BIG4 + 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
  (21.19) (21.21) (21.50) (21.61) (21.46) (21.57) (21.41) (21.61) 
GAAP ? −0.074*** −0.074*** −0.074*** −0.075*** −0.076*** −0.075*** −0.073*** −0.075*** 
  (−7.13) (−7.15) (−7.13) (−7.20) (−7.27) (−7.22) (−7.05) (−7.20) 
CHGAAP + 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.086*** 
  (5.65) (5.66) (5.75) (5.82) (5.75) (5.80) (5.72) (5.82) 
INDSPEC + −0.390*** −0.390*** −0.390*** −0.394*** −0.391*** −0.394*** −0.392*** −0.393*** 
  (−11.67) (−11.64) (−11.64) (−11.70) (−11.64) (−11.69) (−11.67) (−11.67) 
CHUDITOR + 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
  (1.67) (1.71) (1.70) (1.67) (1.65) (1.68) (1.67) (1.67) 
LASTYRAUDIT +/− 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.30) (0.31) (0.24) (0.23) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) 
MODOPINIONS + 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
  (18.69) (18.61) (18.28) (17.63) (18.02) (17.70) (18.19) (17.67) 
CHCEO +/− 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.033*** 
  (4.61) (5.10) (6.53) (7.17) (4.99) (6.49) (6.03) (7.17) 
CITY + 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
  
47
  (18.73) (18.76) (18.77) (18.63) (18.66) (18.60) (18.51) (18.73) 
Constant  0.376*** 0.349*** 0.317*** 0.282*** 0.311*** 0.292*** 0.327*** 0.278*** 
  (14.61) (13.86) (12.74) (11.53) (12.60) (11.86) (13.12) (11.38) 
County fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 
Adjusted R2  0.529 0.529 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 0.528 
 
This table presents OLS−regression coefficients (t−values in parentheses) for the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships on 
audit fees. The dependent variable is LNFEE, the natural log of audit fees in NOK 1,000. The sample is described in Table 1 and variables are 
defined in the Appendix except for the test variables in Model 2 which are measured as indicator variables defined as 1 if the test variable is 
greater than or equal to the mean and 0 otherwise. County, industry, and year fixed effects are included but omitted from table to conserve space. 
All regressions employ robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels (two−sided), respectively.  
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TABLE 4 
Logit Regressions of Choice of Big 4 Auditor on Ownership, CEO, and Board Characteristics, as well as Control Variables 
 Predicted 
sign 
Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
OWNER_CONC (H1b) − −0.227*** −0.096*** −0.078**      
  (−4.16) (−2.89) (−2.22)      
OWNER_SECOND (H2b) − −0.753*** −0.258***  −0.357***     
  (−10.06) (−8.70)  (−6.58)     
OWNER_CEO (H3b) − −0.052 −0.087***   −0.106***    
  (−1.26) (−3.45)   (−3.81)    
FAM_CEO/OWNER (H4b) +/– −0.027 −0.023    −0.109***   
  (−0.93) (−0.88)    (−5.27)   
FAM_BOARD/OWNER (H5b) − −0.219*** −0.139***     −0.248***  
  (−6.04) (−5.96)     (−8.35)  
FAM_BOARD/CEO (H6b) +/– 0.027 0.010      −0.119*** 
  (0.61) (0.39)      (−3.06) 
 
LNTA + 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.357*** 0.360*** 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.347*** 0.361*** 
  (34.58) (35.12) (37.49) (38.21) (37.18) (37.69) (36.53) (38.32) 
LEV + −0.442*** −0.450*** −0.467*** −0.465*** −0.466*** −0.468*** −0.466*** −0.473*** 
  (−9.92) (−10.11) (−10.49) (−10.47) (−10.48) (−10.54) (−10.46) (−10.63) 
UNSECURED + 0.361*** 0.365*** 0.381*** 0.384*** 0.380*** 0.377*** 0.361*** 0.378*** 
  (7.84) (7.92) (8.29) (8.37) (8.28) (8.21) (7.82) (8.21) 
LOSS ? 0.130*** 0.133*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.148*** 
  (7.24) (7.39) (8.27) (8.19) (8.17) (8.14) (7.76) (8.26) 
FOREIGN + 0.319*** 0.321*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.327*** 0.337*** 
  (4.23) (4.26) (4.52) (4.48) (4.52) (4.49) (4.33) (4.47) 
EXANTEFIN + 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 
  (3.37) (3.43) (3.48) (3.53) (3.44) (3.44) (3.47) (3.53) 
INCPIC + −0.017 −0.011 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.009 −0.002 0.014 
  (−0.64) (−0.41) (0.44) (0.60) (0.41) (0.36) (−0.07) (0.54) 
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Table 4, continued 
ROA – −0.374*** −0.389*** −0.443*** −0.439*** −0.438*** −0.439*** −0.414*** −0.449*** 
  (−8.39) (−8.73) (−9.94) (−9.89) (−9.85) (−9.89) (−9.30) (−10.11) 
CITY + 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 
  (3.21) (3.21) (3.31) (3.23) (3.28) (3.23) (3.15) (3.20) 
Constant  −4.300*** −4.523*** −4.945*** −4.945*** −4.917*** −4.902*** −4.731*** −5.002*** 
  (−25.84) (−28.01) (−31.07) (−31.71) (−31.17) (−31.24) (−29.79) (−32.16) 
Count fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 185,109 
Pseudo R2  0.101 0.101 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099 
 
This table presents logistic regression coefficients (z−values in parentheses) for the impact of ownership characteristics and family relationships 
on the choice of Big 4 auditors. The sample is described in Table 1 and variables are defined in the Appendix except for the test variables in 
Model 2 which are measured as indicator variables defined as 1 if the test variable is greater than or equal to mean and 0 otherwise. County, 
industry, and year fixed effects are included in the models but omitted from the table in order to conserve space. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level are employed. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two−sided), respectively.  
 
